Michael Novakhov – SharedNewsLinks℠ – In 50 Brief Posts
Michael Novakhov - SharedNewsLinks ![]() | ||
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Azerbaijan: The invisible hand behind Russia’s oil exports to Europe | ||
Thu, 01 May 2025 13:40:28 -0400
Ara Nazarian is an associate professor of Orthopaedic Surgery at Harvard Medical School. He graduated from Tennessee Technological University with a degree in mechanical engineering, followed by graduate degrees from Boston University, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and Harvard University. He has been involved in the Armenian community for over a decade, having served in a variety of capacities at the Hamazkayin Armenian Educational and Cultural Society, the Armenian Cultural and Educational Center, Armenian National Committee of America, St. Stephen’s Armenian Elementary School and the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. | ||
From Silk Road to strategy: Baku, Beijing align for multipolar future | ||
Thu, 01 May 2025 02:55:12 -0400
By Mazahir Afandiyev I AzerNEWS At a time when the global political architecture is being reshaped—particularly against the backdrop of the new challenges brought by the Fourth Industrial Revolution—every country seeks to secure its national interests by participating in global processes and managing its economic and political relations with other states. Although many international organizations advocate for peaceful and dialogue-based solutions to global issues, recent experiences show that states with economic resilience and broad military-political capabilities have a stronger say in international affairs. In this new multipolar world order, the People's Republic of China has begun to play a more critical role, solidifying its position in certain regions and creating new opportunities for cooperation. In Azerbaijan’s case, the foundation of friendly and partnership relations with China is linked to the name of National Leader Heydar Aliyev. During his tenure as First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Heydar Aliyev held numerous meetings with Chinese representatives, being well-informed about China’s dynamics and development. These contacts continued successfully during Azerbaijan’s years of independence. After gaining independence, mutual official visits between the two countries’ high-ranking officials further strengthened diplomatic ties. Heydar Aliyev’s official visits to China and meetings with its leaders laid the groundwork for future cooperation. During his first official visit to China from March 7–10, 1994, National Leader Heydar Aliyev met with President Jiang Zemin and Prime Minister Li Peng. During this visit, a joint declaration on the fundamentals of developing friendly relations between the two countries was signed, along with eight agreements covering topics such as the opening of air routes, scientific-technical and cultural cooperation, medicine, radio and television, and tourism. These successfully established relations have been further strengthened over the past 20 years under the leadership of President Ilham Aliyev. Since 2005, President Aliyev has made several visits to China. However, his state visit to the People's Republic of China from April 22–24, 2025, can be considered a historic milestone in bilateral cooperation. As a result of bilateral and extended meetings with the President of China, a Joint Declaration on Establishing Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Relations comprising 18 clauses was signed. This agreement opens new avenues for Azerbaijan—the leading country of the South Caucasus—to expand future cooperation with other states. In particular, the agreement on lifting the visa regime between the two countries increases expectations for the continued development of friendly and respectful relations. As highlighted by the President in an interview with China Global Television Network during his visit, "Azerbaijan has signed strategic partnership declarations with many countries in the South Caucasus region and even some European countries, but the one with China is the strongest among them." In the same interview, President Ilham Aliyev touched on all aspects of modern cooperation with China, clarifying various points of interest related to political, economic, cultural, and humanitarian fields for a vast audience. It should be noted that China has succeeded in creating a new reality in the Eurasian region and globally over the past decade. Azerbaijan, too, aims to deepen relations globally based on mutual respect and trust. It strives to define new directions in line with the challenges of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, while also working to attract investment and boost capital inflows into the country. As the President emphasized, Azerbaijan possesses significant logistical capabilities in the North-South and East-West transportation corridors. The country is committed to being a reliable energy supplier and enhancing its trade turnover. This effort continues to deepen and diversify day by day. Azerbaijan also joined the “Belt and Road” initiative, proposed by China in 2013 to improve infrastructure and connectivity across Eurasian countries. Within this initiative, a new trade corridor has been established to transport goods directly from East to West under favorable conditions. Notably, Azerbaijan was the first country in the Caucasus to support China’s “Belt and Road” initiative. In this context, Azerbaijan plays the role of a logistics hub, junction, and bridge in implementing the strategy. Thus, Azerbaijan's transportation and logistics advantages—critical for both the ancient Silk Road and the modern “Belt and Road” initiative—are clearly evident. The bilateral economic-political relations established with friendly countries, as well as Azerbaijan’s commitment, solidarity, and alliances demonstrated in international organizations, are valuable not only for our country and region but for the entire Eurasian continent. We can confidently say that the direction defined by President Ilham Aliyev in Azerbaijan’s multi-vector foreign policy is aimed at a prosperous future and reflects the intention to deepen relations with Eurasian countries—particularly with the People's Republic of China—in the fields of economy, politics, culture, and humanitarian cooperation. Mazahir Afandiyev, the author is a member of the Azerbaijani Parliament | ||
Elon Musk takes hit as Europeans ditch X in droves | ||
Wed, 30 Apr 2025 16:15:31 -0400
Trump-Ukraine minerals deal hits yet another late snagU.S. president has previously described such a pact as reimbursement for billions in American aid sent to help Kyiv against Russia’s full-scale invasion. 5 HRS ago 4 mins read
Von der Leyen slams Trump: We don’t punish neighborsCommission president criticizes the American leader’s trade war, approach to other countries and targeting of universities. Apr 29 3 mins read
Malta’s ‘golden passport’ scheme is illegal, EU top court rulesCourt of Justice of the EU says Tuesday the program was nothing short of the “commercialisation” of citizenship. Apr 29 2 mins read
Canada’s conservative leader Pierre Poilievre loses his own seat in election collapseThe remarkable campaign was upended by a backlash against U.S. President Donald Trump, which sparked a stunning liberal resurgence. Apr 29 2 mins read | ||
Франция обвинила военную разведку России в кибератаках | ||
Tue, 29 Apr 2025 13:45:17 -0400
Во вторник Франция официально обвинила российскую военную разведку в кибератаках на страну на протяжении последнего десятилетия, включая взлом предвыборной кампании президента Эммануэля Макрона в 2017 году и атаку на телевизионную сеть TV5 Monde в 2015 году. Об этом сообщает AFP. "Военная разведка России (ГРУ) на протяжении нескольких лет ведёт кибератаки против Франции, используя хакерскую группу, известную под названием APT28", — заявил министр иностранных дел Жан-Ноэль Барро в посте в социальной сети X, впервые официально возложив ответственность за эти атаки на ГРУ. В 2017 году газета Financial Times писала, что Российская Федерация мобилизовала хакерскую группу АРТ28 (другие названия - Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear, BlueDelta). Она известна своими атаками на французскую телевизионную сеть TV5Monde, частную военную компанию США Blackwater, Минобороны Франции, Венгрии и Госдепартамент США. Специалисты по кибербезопасности США, Британии, Израиля и Германии уже тогда заявляли, что приказы АРТ28 отдает главное разведывательное управление России. Москва категорически отрицает свое сотрудничество с хакерами. | ||
AI-Powered OSINT Tools in 2025 | How Artificial Intelligence is Transforming Open-Source Intelligence Gathering | ||
Mon, 28 Apr 2025 13:17:40 -0400
The rise of AI-powered OSINT tools in 2025 has revolutionized the way intelligence professionals, cybersecurity experts, and law enforcement agencies collect and analyze open-source data. AI-driven OSINT tools can automate reconnaissance, analyze large datasets, and detect hidden patterns, making intelligence gathering faster and more efficient. From social media tracking and deepfake detection to NLP-based data analysis and machine learning-driven threat detection, AI enhances the accuracy and effectiveness of OSINT investigations. However, ethical concerns, misinformation risks, and AI model limitations remain challenges. This blog explores the best AI tools for OSINT in 2025, their benefits, challenges, and future trends in intelligence gathering.Table of Contents
IntroductionIn 2025, Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) remains a vital tool for cybersecurity, threat intelligence, law enforcement, and competitive analysis. With the integration of artificial intelligence (AI), OSINT data collection has become more efficient, precise, and automated than ever before. AI-powered tools can scan massive datasets, extract actionable insights, and automate intelligence gathering, reducing human effort while increasing accuracy. From automated web crawlers to AI-driven social media analysis, facial recognition, NLP-based intelligence gathering, and deepfake detection, AI is changing the landscape of OSINT investigations. This blog explores the best AI tools for OSINT in 2025, their functionalities, and how they assist intelligence professionals in gathering and analyzing open-source data. What is OSINT and Why is AI Important?Understanding OSINTOSINT (Open-Source Intelligence) involves collecting and analyzing publicly available data from multiple sources, including:
How AI Enhances OSINTAI-driven OSINT tools offer several advantages:
AI significantly improves the speed, accuracy, and efficiency of OSINT investigations, helping professionals track threats, verify sources, and extract intelligence with minimal human intervention. Best AI Tools for OSINT Data Gathering in 20251. Maltego – AI-Powered Network AnalysisMaltego is one of the most advanced AI-driven OSINT tools for intelligence gathering and digital forensics.
2. OSINT Framework – AI-Enhanced Data DiscoveryOSINT Framework is an open-source intelligence tool that integrates AI for advanced data discovery.
3. Shodan – AI-Based Internet ReconnaissanceShodan is known as the "Google for hackers," allowing OSINT professionals to scan and track internet-connected devices.
4. SpiderFoot – AI-Powered Digital Footprint AnalysisSpiderFoot is an automated OSINT tool designed to analyze an individual's or organization’s online footprint.
5. Google Dorking – AI-Assisted Advanced SearchGoogle Dorking leverages AI to extract hidden data from search engines.
6. Social-Searcher – AI for Social Media IntelligenceSocial-Searcher is an AI-powered social media OSINT tool used for tracking online activities.
How AI Improves OSINT Investigations
Challenges of AI in OSINTDespite its advantages, AI-based OSINT tools face some challenges:
The Future of AI in OSINTThe future of AI in OSINT is expected to include:
As AI technology continues to evolve, OSINT professionals will rely more on AI-driven automation, predictive analysis, and deep learning models to gather intelligence effectively. ConclusionAI-powered OSINT tools are reshaping the way intelligence is gathered and analyzed in 2025. From automated social media monitoring to advanced data discovery and digital footprint tracking, AI helps professionals detect threats, verify information, and uncover hidden intelligence efficiently. While AI brings speed, scalability, and precision to OSINT, it is not without challenges. Ethical considerations, misinformation detection, and AI model accuracy remain critical concerns. For organizations and cybersecurity professionals, leveraging AI-powered OSINT tools is no longer optional—it is essential for staying ahead in the intelligence and cybersecurity landscape. FAQsWhat is OSINT, and how does AI improve it?OSINT (Open-Source Intelligence) involves collecting publicly available information for intelligence and security purposes. AI enhances OSINT by automating data collection, analyzing patterns, and improving threat detection accuracy. Which are the best AI-powered OSINT tools in 2025?Some of the top AI-driven OSINT tools include Maltego, Shodan, SpiderFoot, Social-Searcher, Google Dorking, and OSINT Framework, each specializing in different aspects of intelligence gathering. How does AI automate OSINT data collection?AI uses web crawlers, machine learning algorithms, and data mining techniques to scan, extract, and analyze large amounts of publicly available information. Can AI detect deepfakes and misinformation in OSINT?Yes, AI-powered tools can detect deepfakes and misinformation by analyzing synthetic media patterns, facial recognition inconsistencies, and AI-generated text anomalies. How does AI assist in cybersecurity OSINT?AI helps in cybersecurity OSINT by identifying vulnerabilities, monitoring cyber threats, detecting phishing attempts, and analyzing hacker activities on dark web forums. What role does NLP play in OSINT investigations?Natural Language Processing (NLP) enables AI to extract intelligence from text-based sources, such as news articles, social media posts, and leaked documents. Can AI track individuals and organizations through OSINT?Yes, AI-powered OSINT tools can analyze digital footprints, social media activity, and network connections to track individuals and organizations. What are the ethical concerns of AI in OSINT?AI-driven OSINT raises ethical concerns related to privacy, mass surveillance, data misuse, and the potential for AI-generated disinformation. Is AI-powered OSINT legal?AI-powered OSINT is legal if used for ethical investigations, cybersecurity, and law enforcement purposes, but unauthorized surveillance and data scraping may violate regulations. How does AI-powered OSINT help in law enforcement?Law enforcement agencies use AI for crime investigation, tracking suspects, detecting fraud, and identifying cyber threats. What is Google Dorking, and how does AI enhance it?Google Dorking is an advanced search technique used to find hidden online data. AI enhances Google Dorking by automating queries and detecting exposed sensitive information. Can AI detect fake social media accounts in OSINT investigations?Yes, AI analyzes account activity, language patterns, and metadata to identify fake profiles, bots, and coordinated misinformation campaigns. How does AI detect cyber threats using OSINT?AI scans dark web forums, security reports, and hacker discussions to predict and prevent potential cyberattacks. What are the challenges of using AI for OSINT?Challenges include data accuracy issues, ethical concerns, AI model biases, reliance on public data, and difficulties in detecting sophisticated deepfakes. Can AI identify security vulnerabilities through OSINT?Yes, AI-powered tools like Shodan and SpiderFoot scan exposed devices, open ports, and unprotected servers to identify security risks. How is machine learning applied in OSINT?Machine learning in OSINT is used for pattern recognition, behavior analysis, anomaly detection, and automated intelligence reporting. How does AI enhance social media intelligence gathering?AI tracks trending topics, sentiment analysis, fake news detection, and user behavior monitoring across multiple platforms. Can AI OSINT tools access the dark web?Yes, some AI-powered OSINT tools scan dark web marketplaces and forums for leaked credentials, cybercrime discussions, and emerging threats. What industries benefit from AI-powered OSINT?Industries such as cybersecurity, law enforcement, corporate security, journalism, and competitive intelligence benefit from AI-driven OSINT solutions. How does AI identify misinformation in OSINT data?AI uses fact-checking databases, linguistic analysis, and AI-generated content detection to verify the authenticity of information. Is AI OSINT useful for financial fraud detection?Yes, AI detects fraudulent financial transactions, insider trading, and money laundering schemes by analyzing public financial records and market data. What role does facial recognition play in AI-driven OSINT?Facial recognition AI helps identify individuals in public images, security footage, and social media platforms, aiding in investigations. How does AI contribute to open-source cyber threat intelligence?AI enhances cyber threat intelligence by analyzing malware reports, hacker activities, and vulnerability disclosures from public sources. Can AI predict future cyber threats using OSINT?Yes, AI uses predictive analytics and historical data patterns to forecast potential cyber threats and attack trends. What is the difference between AI-driven OSINT and traditional OSINT?Traditional OSINT relies on manual searches and human analysis, while AI-driven OSINT automates data collection, enhances accuracy, and processes large datasets faster. Can AI-powered OSINT be used for competitive intelligence?Yes, businesses use AI OSINT to monitor competitor strategies, market trends, brand mentions, and industry news. How does AI help journalists and researchers with OSINT?AI assists journalists and researchers by fact-checking sources, analyzing large volumes of public records, and detecting fake news. What are the future trends in AI for OSINT?Future trends include AI-powered deepfake detection, blockchain-integrated OSINT, automated misinformation tracking, and AI-driven risk assessments. Should organizations invest in AI-powered OSINT tools?Yes, organizations should invest in AI-driven OSINT tools to enhance security, improve threat intelligence, and gain valuable insights for decision-making. | ||
Opinion | The Two Faces of Azerbaijan’s Mr. Aliyev | ||
Sun, 27 Apr 2025 10:45:53 -0400
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Trump and Zelenskiy meet one-on-one in Vatican basilica to seek Ukraine peace | ||
Sat, 26 Apr 2025 11:14:32 -0400
VATICAN CITY, April 26 (Reuters) - U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskiy, in Rome for the funeral of Pope Francis, met one-on-one in a marble-lined Vatican basilica on Saturday to try to revive faltering efforts to end Russia's war with Ukraine. Zelenskiy said the meeting could prove historic if it delivers the kind of peace he is hoping for, and a White House spokesman called it "very productive". The Reuters Tariff Watch newsletter is your daily guide to the latest global trade and tariff news. Sign up here. The two leaders, leaning in close to each other with no aides around them while seated in St Peter's Basilica, spoke for about 15 minutes, according to Zelenskiy's office, and images of the meeting released by Kyiv and Washington. The meeting at the Vatican, their first since an angry encounter in the Oval Office in Washington in February, comes at a critical time in negotiations aimed at bringing an end to fighting between Ukraine and Russia. After Pope Francis's funeral service, Trump boarded Air Force One and departed Rome. While in the air he published a social media post in which he took a tough tone on Russian President Vladimir Putin. "There was no reason for Putin to be shooting missiles into civilian areas, cities and towns, over the last few days," Trump posted on Truth Social. Twelve people were killed on Thursday when a missile fired by Russia hit a Kyiv apartment block. "It makes me think that maybe he doesn’t want to stop the war, he's just tapping me along, and has to be dealt with differently, through 'Banking' or 'Secondary Sanctions?' Too many people are dying!!!" Trump wrote. Trump's post was a departure from his usual rhetoric which has seen the toughest criticism directed at Zelenskiy, while he has spoken positively about Putin. In a post on social media platform Telegram, Zelenskiy wrote: "Good meeting. One-on-one, we managed to discuss a lot. We hope for a result from all the things that were spoken about." He said those topics included: "The protection of the lives of our people. A complete and unconditional ceasefire. A reliable and lasting peace that will prevent a recurrence of war." Zelenskiy added: "It was a very symbolic meeting that has the potential to become historic if we achieve joint results. Thank you, President Donald Trump!" NO AIDES IN SIGHTIn one photograph released by Zelenskiy's office, the Ukrainian and U.S. leaders sat opposite each other in a hall of the basilica, around two feet apart, and were leaning in towards each other in conversation. No aides could be seen in the image. In a second photograph, from the same location, Zelenskiy, Trump, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron were shown standing in a tight huddle. Macron had his hand on Zelenskiy's shoulder. After Trump and Zelenskiy met in the basilica, the two men joined other world leaders outside in Saint Peter's Square at the funeral service for Pope Francis, who made the pursuit of peace, including in Ukraine, a motif of his papacy. Italian Cardinal Giovanni Battista Re, who gave the sermon at the funeral service, recalled how Pope Francis did not stop raising his voice to call for negotiations to end conflicts. "War always leaves the world worse than it was before: it is always a painful and tragic defeat for everyone," the cardinal said. DIFFERENCES OVER TERRITORYTrump has been pressing both Moscow and Kyiv to agree a ceasefire and peace deal. He had previously warned his administration would walk away from its efforts to achieve a peace if the two sides do not agree a deal soon. After a round of shuttle diplomacy this week, differences have emerged between the position of the Trump White House on peace talks and the stance of Ukraine and its European allies, according to documents from the talks obtained by Reuters. Washington is proposing a legal recognition that Crimea, the Ukrainian peninsula annexed by Moscow in 2014, is Russian territory, something that Kyiv and its allies in Europe say is a red line they will not cross. There are also differences on how quickly sanctions on Russia would be lifted if a peace deal was signed, what kind of security guarantees Ukraine would have, and how Ukraine would be financially compensated. Trump and Zelenskiy have had a rocky personal relationship. At their Oval Office meeting, Trump accused the Ukrainian leader of "gambling with World War Three". Since then, Kyiv has tried to repair relations, but the barbs have continued. Zelenskiy has said Trump was trapped in a "disinformation bubble" that favoured Moscow, while the U.S. leader accused Zelenskiy of foot-dragging on a peace deal and making "inflammatory" statements. But the two men need each other. Trump requires Zelenskiy's buy-in to achieve his stated ambition of bringing a swift peace between Russia and Ukraine, while Kyiv needs Trump to pressure Moscow into diluting some of the more onerous conditions it has set for a truce. At the Oval Office meeting in February, a reporter who was present from a conservative U.S. news network accused Zelenskiy of disrespecting the occasion by not wearing a suit. Zelenskiy, since the start of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, has eschewed suits in favour of military-style attire, saying it is his way of showing solidarity with his countryman fighting to defend Ukraine. In Rome on Saturday, Zelenskiy again decided against a suit, and instead wore a dark shirt, buttoned up to the neck with no tie, and wore a dark military-style jacket over the top of that. Reporting by Steve Holland and Angelo Amante; Additional reporting by Christian Lowe and Andrii Pryimachenko in Kyiv and Alistair Smout in London; Writing by Christian Lowe; Editing by Alexandra Hudson Our Standards: The Thomson Reuters Trust Principles., opens new tab | ||
Ukraine hit by another night of deadly Russian strikes despite Trump’s ‘Vladimir, STOP!’ plea | CNN | ||
Fri, 25 Apr 2025 07:05:56 -0400
CNN — Moscow has inflicted another round of deadly strikes on Ukraine despite US President Donald Trump’s plea for Russian President Vladimir Putin to “STOP!” attacking its neighbor. At least eight people were killed in drone strikes across the country, a night after Russia launched its deadliest bombardment of Ukraine since the middle of last year. A drone attack on the eastern city of Pavlohrad on Friday killed three people, including a 76-year-old woman and a child, and injured 10 others, Dnipropetrovsk Governor Serhiy Lysak said. In southern Ukraine, two people were also killed in strikes on Kherson, the region’s governor, Oleksandr Prokudin, said, adding the strikes targeted critical infrastructure and residential buildings. Two more people died in attacks on Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk region, and one person was killed in Kharkiv in the northeast of the country, regional leaders said. Ukraine’s capital Kyiv was the main target of Russia’s massive bombardment on Thursday, which hit several locations across the city, killing 12 people and wounding 87 others. Ukraine’s emergency services said on Friday that it had completed the search for survivors in the rubble of one residential block, hit by what Ukrainian authorities said was a North Korean ballistic missile. The fresh round of attacks come after President Trump vented his frustration over the lack of progress on a peace deal on Thursday, saying he is “not happy” and urging Putin to “STOP!” the attacks, in a post on his Truth Social platform. Hours later, however, Trump said he believed both Russia and Ukraine want peace. On Friday, Trump’s special envoy Steve Witkoff is expected to arrive in Moscow for further talks with Putin on reaching an agreement. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Moscow was “ready to reach a deal,” in an interview with CBS News on Thursday, but added that there were still some specific points that needed to be “fine-tuned.” Earlier this week, Trump launched a new tirade against Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, accusing him of harming peace negotiations, after Zelensky said it was against his country’s constitution to recognize Russian control of Crimea, which was illegally annexed by Russia in 2014. Any move to recognize Russia’s control of Crimea would reverse a decade of US policy and could upset the widely held post-World War Two consensus that international borders should not be changed by force. As part of its mission to seal a peace deal to end the three-year war, the US administration has proposed recognizing Crimea as part of Russia, a move which diplomatic sources have told CNN has highly alarmed US allies in Europe. The spat over Crimea is the latest in a series of very public disagreements between Trump and Zelensky. Trump has insisted he has been equally as tough on Putin, but got defensive on Thursday when asked by White House reporters what concessions Russia had made in the conflict. “Stopping the war, stopping taking the whole country. Pretty big concession,” Trump said. “We’re putting a lot of pressure on Russia, and Russia knows that, and some people that are close to it know or he wouldn’t be talking right now.” Jennifer Hansler, Alex Marquardt and Kylie Atwood contributed reporting | ||
Hundreds of scholars say U.S. is swiftly heading toward authoritarianism | ||
Tue, 22 Apr 2025 05:46:55 -0400
U.S. President-elect Donald Trump looks on during Turning Point USA's AmericaFest at the Phoenix Convention Center on Dec. 22, 2024, in Phoenix. The annual four day conference geared toward energizing and connecting conservative youth hosts some of the country's leading conservative politicians and activists. Rebecca Noble/Getty Images hide caption toggle caption Rebecca Noble/Getty Images WASHINGTON — A survey of more than 500 political scientists finds that the vast majority think the United States is moving swiftly from liberal democracy toward some form of authoritarianism. In the benchmark survey, known as Bright Line Watch, U.S.-based professors rate the performance of American democracy on a scale from zero (complete dictatorship) to 100 (perfect democracy). After President Trump's election in November, scholars gave American democracy a rating of 67. Several weeks into Trump's second term, that figure plummeted to 55. "That's a precipitous drop," says John Carey, a professor of government at Dartmouth and co-director of Bright Line Watch. "There's certainly consensus: We're moving in the wrong direction." Carey said the decline between November and February was the biggest since Bright Line Watch began surveying scholars on threats to American democracy in 2017. In the survey, respondents consider 30 indicators of democratic performance, including whether the government interferes with the press, punishes political opponents and whether the legislature and the judiciary can check executive authority. Not all political scientists view Trump with alarm, but many like Carey who focus on democracy and authoritarianism are deeply troubled by Trump's attempts to expand executive power over his first several months in office. "We've slid into some form of authoritarianism," says Steven Levitsky, a professor of government at Harvard, and co-author of How Democracies Die. "It is relatively mild compared to some others. It is certainly reversible, but we are no longer living in a liberal democracy." Protesters wave Turkish flags in front of the New Mosque in Istanbul. Despite a government protest ban, mass demonstrations erupted nationwide following the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu on corruption charges, with crowds demanding democracy and chanting "people, rights, justice." Scholars of democracy view Turkey as a competitive authoritarian regime in which the ruling party uses institutions such as the courts to attack their political opponents. Su Cassiano/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty hide caption toggle caption Su Cassiano/Middle East Images/AFP via Getty Kim Lane Scheppele, a Princeton sociologist who has spent years tracking Hungary, is also deeply concerned: "We are on a very fast slide into what's called competitive authoritarianism." When these scholars use the term "authoritarianism," they aren't talking about a system like China's, a one-party state with no meaningful elections. Instead, they are referring to something called "competitive authoritarianism," the kind scholars say they see in countries such as Hungary and Turkey. In a competitive authoritarian system, a leader comes to power democratically and then erodes the system of checks and balances. Typically, the executive fills the civil service and key appointments — including the prosecutor's office and judiciary — with loyalists. He or she then attacks the media, universities and nongovernmental organizations to blunt public criticism and tilt the electoral playing field in the ruling party's favor. "The government would still have elections and would nominally be democratic," says Rory Truex, a political scientist at Princeton who focuses on China. "But those elections would no longer be free and fair." A man walks next to a graffiti with the image of the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez in Caracas. Political scientists say that President Trump does not enjoy the huge popular support that leaders like Chávez harnessed to dominate their nation's political systems. Raul Arboleda/AFP via Getty Images hide caption toggle caption Raul Arboleda/AFP via Getty Images While the vast majority of scholars surveyed say Trump is pushing the country toward autocracy, other professors strongly disagree. James Campbell, a retired political scientist at the University at Buffalo, SUNY, says Trump is using legitimate presidential powers to address long-standing problems. Campbell points to Trump's use of tariffs to try to push companies to bring manufacturing jobs back to the United States. In recent decades, economic globalization led to catastrophic layoffs of everyone from furniture makers in North Carolina to auto assembly-line workers in the Midwest as firms sent work overseas, especially to China. "I think they've done an excellent job," Campbell says of the Trump administration. Campbell adds that he thinks many political scientists may see Trump as autocratic because they don't like him or his politics. "I think most of them are coming from the political left," he says. "There's a comfort in all of them getting together and saying, 'Oh, Trump's a bad guy. He's authoritarian.' " NPR reached out to the Trump administration, which has yet to respond. President Trump has spoken admiringly of Hungary's Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. U.S. scholars of democracy say Orbán has used various tactics, including stocking state agencies with loyalists and attacking media business models, to turn Hungary into a competitive authoritarian state. Under competitive authoritarianism, there are still elections, but the playing field is tilted in favor of the ruling party. Attila Kisbenedek/AFP via Getty Images hide caption toggle caption Attila Kisbenedek/AFP via Getty Images But many democracy scholars say the Trump administration is using tactics employed by autocrats, and they point to specific actions. For instance, Trump's Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is investigating all the major broadcast outlets — except for Rupert Murdoch's Fox, which owns the pro-Trump Fox News Channel. The FCC is questioning how CBS edited an interview of Trump's 2024 rival, Kamala Harris, and whether NPR and PBS are complying with regulations on corporate underwriting spots. The FCC can revoke local broadcast licenses, which could damage the networks financially. Princeton's Scheppele says this is reminiscent of Hungary under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Orbán took aim at the business model of Hungarian media, which heavily relied on state advertising. "Overnight, [Orbán] cuts all the advertising to the independent and opposition media," Scheppele says. "They all have a hole blown in their budget." In another example, Trump has withheld or threatened to withhold billions of dollars from universities, including Harvard, Princeton and Columbia, citing concerns about antisemitism. Scheppele says Orbán also targeted universities that had been critical of his government. "In the first two years, Orbán cut the university budgets by 40%," she says. Another way to measure authoritarianism, according to Levitsky, is whether publicly opposing the government comes with a cost. He says — under Trump — it does. For instance, Trump has issued executive orders barring lawyers with firms he doesn't like from entering government buildings and representing government contractors. Fear of government retribution is now spreading through society. A scholar who spoke to NPR for this story later asked not to be quoted, saying he feared the Trump administration might try to punish him by slashing research grants he's working on. In a recent NPR series on free speech, many people did not want to be identified by name. Teachers, students and their sympathizers protest in central Budapest following a government-mandated "smartphone ban" in schools that was signed by nationalist Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Attila Kisbenedek/AFP via Getty Images hide caption toggle caption Attila Kisbenedek/AFP via Getty Images But even some scholars who say Trump has autocratic tendencies think the American system should be able to withstand them. Kurt Weyland, a political scientist at the University of Texas at Austin, says that so far the lower courts are checking Trump. He also says Trump does not have the overwhelming popular support that autocratic leaders such as Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and El Salvador's Nayib Bukele enjoyed and that was crucial to their ability to change their country's political systems. For instance, Bukele, who met with Trump at the White House last week, has seen approval ratings over 90% and won reelection last year by a landslide. By contrast, a recent poll showed Trump's approval rating falling to 43% and he was reelected with just under half the popular vote. "These populist leaders managed to engineer new constitutions that seriously concentrated power and that were the breakpoint that put those countries on the path toward competitive authoritarian rule," says Weyland, who wrote Democracy's Resilience to Populism's Threat: Countering Global Alarmism. "In the United States, that is out of the question." Bright Line Watch conducted its survey in early February. It plans to put another in the field soon. Carey, one of the co-directors, expects political scientists to downgrade America's democracy even further. | ||
Azerbaijan : Baku's masterminds tracking down opponents abroad - 08/03/2024 - Intelligence Online | ||
Sun, 20 Apr 2025 06:12:37 -0400
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Mounting Calls for Shin Bet Chief Ronen Bar’s Resignation Amid October 7 Failures and "Qatargate" Scandal | ||
Thu, 17 Apr 2025 10:29:55 -0400
(TJV NEWS) Pressure is intensifying on Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and key government officials move to oust him following deepening allegations of negligence and political misuse of his office. At the heart of the storm are the devastating failures that led to the October 7 Hamas invasion and the unfolding “Qatargate” scandal involving foreign money and influence in Israel’s political sphere. Netanyahu’s spokesperson Omer Dostri previously accused Bar of failing to act on critical intelligence that could have prevented the massacre. “Ronen Bar had the opportunity to retire with honor after his searing failure on October 7, as the outgoing Chief of Staff did,” Dostri said. “But he preferred not to attend the government meeting dealing with his case simply because he was afraid of giving answers.”
The Prime Minister himself has reportedly lost all confidence in Bar, who remains in office despite calls for his dismissal from bereaved families, security officials, and senior lawmakers. The government has filed a petition with the High Court to lift a temporary order blocking Bar’s removal, arguing that continued immunity for the Shin Bet head undermines Israel’s democratic structure and civilian control over security institutions.
October 7: A Catastrophic Security Breakdown The failure of Israel’s domestic intelligence agency to anticipate or thwart the October 7 attack is now central to calls for Bar’s resignation. Families of soldiers killed in the war say accountability must start at the top. In a raw and emotional interview with 103FM, Tzik Bonzel, father of Sgt. Amit Bonzel who was killed in Gaza, spoke out after a face-to-face meeting with Bar:
Bonzel described the encounter as deeply painful and said Bar appeared unprepared for the intensity of the criticism. “I demanded to know when he would resign and stop harming this holy organization,” Bonzel said. “Qatargate” and Political Weaponization Fueling the storm is the so-called “Qatargate” affair, in which Shin Bet allegedly uncovered that advisers to Netanyahu received funds from Qatar, a nation widely known for financing Hamas. Critics claim the prime minister is attempting to silence Bar to derail the investigation. Left-leaning NGOs, including the Movement for Quality Government (MQG), have accused Netanyahu of politicizing the ISA and attacking law enforcement institutions. But the Prime Minister’s allies argue that Bar has weaponized his position, using the hostage crisis and sensitive information to shield himself from criticism.
Netanyahu’s Approach: Soft Pressure, Hard Questions Though Netanyahu has largely refrained from personal attacks, his decision to invite Bar to join a security briefing this week was widely seen as a final olive branch amid rising tensions. That same day, the government formally requested the High Court lift its hold on Bar’s dismissal.
For many Israelis, the question is no longer whether Ronen Bar should go—but why he hasn’t already. As AllIsrael.com notes, the ongoing court wrangling and political defense of Bar are delaying overdue accountability at a time when public trust in the Shin Bet—and the entire security establishment—is at historic lows. In the eyes of Netanyahu, grieving families, and a growing number of lawmakers, Ronen Bar’s continued leadership is incompatible with national recovery, operational reform, and trust in Israel’s most vital security institutions. The question is whether Israel’s legal system will let the government act—or let this crisis fester furthe | ||
When the New York Times lost its way | ||
Tue, 15 Apr 2025 16:02:21 -0400
By James Bennet Are we truly so precious?” Dean Baquet, the executive editor of the New York Times, asked me one Wednesday evening in June 2020. I was the editorial-page editor of the Times, and we had just published an op-ed by Tom Cotton, a senator from Arkansas, that was outraging many members of the Times staff. America’s conscience had been shocked days before by images of a white police officer kneeling on the neck of a black man, George Floyd, until he died. It was a frenzied time in America, assaulted by covid-19, scalded by police barbarism. Throughout the country protesters were on the march. Substantive reform of the police, so long delayed, suddenly seemed like a real possibility, but so did violence and political backlash. In some cities rioting and looting had broken out. It was the kind of crisis in which journalism could fulfil its highest ambitions of helping readers understand the world, in order to fix it, and in the Times’s Opinion section, which I oversaw, we were pursuing our role of presenting debate from all sides. We had published pieces arguing against the idea of relying on troops to stop the violence, and one urging abolition of the police altogether. But Cotton, an army veteran, was calling for the use of troops to protect lives and businesses from rioters. Some Times reporters and other staff were taking to what was then called Twitter, now called X, to attack the decision to publish his argument, for fear he would persuade Times readers to support his proposal and it would be enacted. The next day the Times’s union—its unit of the NewsGuild-CWA—would issue a statement calling the op-ed “a clear threat to the health and safety of the journalists we represent”. The Times had endured many cycles of Twitter outrage for one story or opinion piece or another. It was never fun; it felt like sticking your head in a metal bucket while people were banging it with hammers. The publisher, A.G. Sulzberger, who was about two years into the job, understood why we’d published the op-ed. He had some criticisms about packaging; he said the editors should add links to other op-eds we’d published with a different view. But he’d emailed me that afternoon, saying: “I get and support the reason for including the piece,” because, he thought, Cotton’s view had the support of the White House as well as a majority of the Senate. As the clamour grew, he asked me to call Baquet, the paper’s most senior editor. Like me, Baquet seemed taken aback by the criticism that Times readers shouldn’t hear what Cotton had to say. Cotton had a lot of influence with the White House, Baquet noted, and he could well be making his argument directly to the president, Donald Trump. Readers should know about it. Cotton was also a possible future contender for the White House himself, Baquet added. And, besides, Cotton was far from alone: lots of Americans agreed with him—most of them, according to some polls. “Are we truly so precious?” Baquet asked again, with a note of wonder and frustration. The answer, it turned out, was yes. Less than three days later, on Saturday morning, Sulzberger called me at home and, with an icy anger that still puzzles and saddens me, demanded my resignation. I got mad, too, and said he’d have to fire me. I thought better of that later. I called him back and agreed to resign, flattering myself that I was being noble. Whether or not American democracy endures, a central question historians are sure to ask about this era is why America came to elect Donald Trump, promoting him from a symptom of the country’s institutional, political and social degradation to its agent-in-chief. There are many reasons for Trump’s ascent, but changes in the American news media played a critical role. Trump’s manipulation and every one of his political lies became more powerful because journalists had forfeited what had always been most valuable about their work: their credibility as arbiters of truth and brokers of ideas, which for more than a century, despite all of journalism’s flaws and failures, had been a bulwark of how Americans govern themselves. I hope those historians will also be able to tell the story of how journalism found its footing again – how editors, reporters and readers, too, came to recognise that journalism needed to change to fulfil its potential in restoring the health of American politics. As Trump’s nomination and possible re-election loom, that work could not be more urgent. I think Sulzberger shares this analysis. In interviews and his own writings, including an essay earlier this year for the Columbia Journalism Review, he has defended “independent journalism”, or, as I understand him, fair-minded, truth-seeking journalism that aspires to be open and objective. It’s good to hear the publisher speak up in defence of such values, some of which have fallen out of fashion not just with journalists at the Times and other mainstream publications but at some of the most prestigious schools of journalism. Until that miserable Saturday morning I thought I was standing shoulder-to-shoulder with him in a struggle to revive them. I thought, and still think, that no American institution could have a better chance than the Times, by virtue of its principles, its history, its people and its hold on the attention of influential Americans, to lead the resistance to the corruption of political and intellectual life, to overcome the encroaching dogmatism and intolerance. But Sulzberger seems to underestimate the struggle he is in, that all journalism and indeed America itself is in. In describing the essential qualities of independent journalism in his essay, he unspooled a list of admirable traits – empathy, humility, curiosity and so forth. These qualities have for generations been helpful in contending with the Times’s familiar problem, which is liberal bias. I have no doubt Sulzberger believes in them. Years ago he demonstrated them himself as a reporter, covering the American Midwest as a real place full of three-dimensional people, and it would be nice if they were enough to deal with the challenge of this era, too. But, on their own, these qualities have no chance against the Times’s new, more dangerous problem, which is in crucial respects the opposite of the old one. The Times’s problem has metastasised from liberal bias to illiberal bias, from an inclination to favour one side of the national debate to an impulse to shut debate down altogether. All the empathy and humility in the world will not mean much against the pressures of intolerance and tribalism without an invaluable quality that Sulzberger did not emphasise: courage. Don’t get me wrong. Most journalism obviously doesn’t require anything like the bravery expected of a soldier, police officer or protester. But far more than when I set out to become a journalist, doing the work right today demands a particular kind of courage: not just the devil-may-care courage to choose a profession on the brink of the abyss; not just the bulldog courage to endlessly pick yourself up and embrace the ever-evolving technology; but also, in an era when polarisation and social media viciously enforce rigid orthodoxies, the moral and intellectual courage to take the other side seriously and to report truths and ideas that your own side demonises for fear they will harm its cause. One of the glories of embracing illiberalism is that, like Trump, you are always right about everything, and so you are justified in shouting disagreement down. In the face of this, leaders of many workplaces and boardrooms across America find that it is so much easier to compromise than to confront – to give a little ground today in the belief you can ultimately bring people around. This is how reasonable Republican leaders lost control of their party to Trump and how liberal-minded college presidents lost control of their campuses. And it is why the leadership of the New York Times is losing control of its principles. Over the decades the Times and other mainstream news organisations failed plenty of times to live up to their commitments to integrity and open-mindedness. The relentless struggle against biases and preconceptions, rather than the achievement of a superhuman objective omniscience, is what mattered. As everyone knows, the internet knocked the industry off its foundations. Local newspapers were the proving ground between college campuses and national newsrooms. As they disintegrated, the national news media lost a source of seasoned reporters and many Americans lost a journalism whose truth they could verify with their own eyes. As the country became more polarised, the national media followed the money by serving partisan audiences the versions of reality they preferred. This relationship proved self-reinforcing. As Americans became freer to choose among alternative versions of reality, their polarisation intensified. When I was at the Times, the newsroom editors worked hardest to keep Washington coverage open and unbiased, no easy task in the Trump era. And there are still people, in the Washington bureau and across the Times, doing work as fine as can be found in American journalism. But as the top editors let bias creep into certain areas of coverage, such as culture, lifestyle and business, that made the core harder to defend and undermined the authority of even the best reporters. There have been signs the Times is trying to recover the courage of its convictions. The paper was slow to display much curiosity about the hard question of the proper medical protocols for trans children; but once it did, the editors defended their coverage against the inevitable criticism. For any counter-revolution to succeed, the leadership will need to show courage worthy of the paper’s bravest reporters and opinion columnists, the ones who work in war zones or explore ideas that make illiberal staff members shudder. As Sulzberger told me in the past, returning to the old standards will require agonising change. He saw that as the gradual work of many years, but I think he is mistaken. To overcome the cultural and commercial pressures the Times faces, particularly given the severe test posed by another Trump candidacy and possible presidency, its publisher and senior editors will have to be bolder than that. Since Adolph Ochs bought the paper in 1896, one of the most inspiring things the Times has said about itself is that it does its work “without fear or favour”. That is not true of the institution today – it cannot be, not when its journalists are afraid to trust readers with a mainstream conservative argument such as Cotton’s, and its leaders are afraid to say otherwise. As preoccupied as it is with the question of why so many Americans have lost trust in it, the Times is failing to face up to one crucial reason: that it has lost faith in Americans, too. For now, to assert that the Times plays by the same rules it always has is to commit a hypocrisy that is transparent to conservatives, dangerous to liberals and bad for the country as a whole. It makes the Times too easy for conservatives to dismiss and too easy for progressives to believe. The reality is that the Times is becoming the publication through which America’s progressive elite talks to itself about an America that does not really exist. It is hard to imagine a path back to saner American politics that does not traverse a common ground of shared fact. It is equally hard to imagine how America’s diversity can continue to be a source of strength, rather than become a fatal flaw, if Americans are afraid or unwilling to listen to each other. I suppose it is also pretty grandiose to think you might help fix all that. But that hope, to me, is what makes journalism worth doing. The New York Times taught me how to do daily journalism. I joined the paper, for my first stint, in the pre-internet days, in an era of American journalism so different that it was almost another profession. Back in 1991 the Times was anxious not about a print business that was collapsing but about an industry so robust that Long Island Newsday was making a push into New York City. A newspaper war was under way, and the Times was fighting back by expanding its Metro desk, hiring reporters and opening bureaus in Brooklyn, Queens and the Bronx. Metro was the biggest news desk. New reporters had to do rotations of up to a year there to learn the culture and folkways of the paper. Baquet, surely among the greatest investigative journalists America has produced, was then in Metro. I was brought on as a probationary reporter, with a year to prove myself, and like other new hires was put through a series of assignments at the low end of the hierarchy. After about six months the Metro editor, Gerald Boyd, asked me to take a walk with him, as it turned out, to deliver a harsh lesson in Timesian ambition and discipline. Chain-smoking, speaking in his whispery, peculiarly high-pitched voice, he kicked my ass from one end of Times Square to the other. He had taken a chance hiring me, and he was disappointed. There was nothing special about my stories. At the rate I was going, I had no chance of making it onto the paper. The next day was a Saturday, and I reached Boyd at home through the Metro desk to rattle off the speech I’d endlessly rehearsed while staring at the ceiling all night. The gist was that the desk had kept me chasing small-bore stories, blah blah blah. Boyd sounded less surprised than amused to hear from me, and soon gave me a new assignment, asking me to spend three months covering the elderly, one of several new “mini-beats” on subjects the desk had overlooked. I was worried there were good reasons this particular beat had been ignored. At 26, as one of the youngest reporters on the desk, I was also not an obvious candidate for the role of house expert on the wise and grey. But Boyd assigned me to an excellent editor, Suzanne Daley, and as I began studying the city’s elderly and interviewing experts and actual old people, I began to discover the rewards granted any serious reporter: that when you acknowledge how little you know, looking in at a world from the outside brings a special clarity. The subject was more complicated and richer than I imagined, and every person had stories to tell. I wrote about hunger, AIDS and romance among the elderly, about old comedians telling old jokes to old people in senior centres. As I reported on Jews who had fled Germany to settle in Washington Heights or black Americans who had left the Jim Crow south to settle in Bushwick, Brooklyn, it dawned on me that, thanks to Boyd, I was covering the history of the world in the 20th century through the eyes of those who had lived it. After joining the permanent staff, I went, again in humbling ignorance, to Detroit, to cover the auto companies’ – and the city’s – struggle to recapture their former glory. And again I had a chance to learn, in this case, everything from how the largest companies in the world were run, to what it was like to work the line or the sales floor, to the struggle and dignity of life in one of America’s most captivating cities. “We still have a long way to go,” Rosa Parks told me, when I interviewed her after she had been robbed and beaten in her home on Detroit’s west side one August night in 1994. “And so many of our children are going astray.” I began to write about presidential politics two years later, in 1996, and as the most inexperienced member of the team was assigned to cover a long-shot Republican candidate, Pat Buchanan. I packed a bag for a four-day reporting trip and did not return home for six weeks. Buchanan campaigned on an eccentric fusion of social conservatism and statist economic policies, along with coded appeals to racism and antisemitism, that 30 years earlier had elevated George Wallace and 20 years later would be rebranded as Trumpism. He also campaigned with conviction, humour and even joy, a combination I have rarely witnessed. As a Democrat from a family of Democrats, a graduate of Yale and a blossom of the imagined meritocracy, I had my first real chance, at Buchanan’s rallies, to see the world through the eyes of stalwart opponents of abortion, immigration and the relentlessly rising tide of modernity. The task of making the world intelligible was even greater in my first foreign assignment. I arrived in Jerusalem a week before the attacks of September 11th 2001, just after the second intifada had broken out. I had been to the Middle East just once, as a White House reporter covering President Bill Clinton. “Well, in at the deep end,” the foreign editor, Roger Cohen, told me before I left. To spend time with the perpetrators and victims of violence in the Middle East, to listen hard to the reciprocal and reinforcing stories of new and ancient grievances, is to confront the tragic truth that there can be justice on more than one side of a conflict. More than ever, it seemed to me that a reporter gave up something in renouncing the taking of sides: possibly the moral high ground, certainly the psychological satisfaction of righteous anger. But there was a compensating moral and psychological privilege that came with aspiring to journalistic neutrality and open-mindedness, despised as they might understandably be by partisans. Unlike the duelling politicians and advocates of all kinds, unlike the corporate chieftains and their critics, unlike even the sainted non-profit workers, you did not have to pretend things were simpler than they actually were. You did not have to go along with everything that any tribe said. You did not have to pretend that the good guys, much as you might have respected them, were right about everything, or that the bad guys, much as you might have disdained them, never had a point. You did not, in other words, ever have to lie. This fundamental honesty was vital for readers, because it equipped them to make better, more informed judgments about the world. Sometimes it might shock or upset them by failing to conform to their picture of reality. But it also granted them the respect of acknowledging that they were able to work things out for themselves. What a gift it was to be taught and trusted as I was by my editors – to be a reporter with licence to ask anyone anything, to experience the whole world as a school and every source and subject as a teacher. I left after 15 years, in 2006, when I had the chance to become editor of the Atlantic. Rather than starting out on yet another beat at the Times, I felt ready to put my experience to work and ambitious for the responsibility to shape coverage myself. It was also obvious how much the internet was changing journalism. I was eager to figure out how to use it, and anxious about being at the mercy of choices by others, in a time not just of existential peril for the industry, but maybe of opportunity. The Atlantic did not aspire to the same role as the Times. It did not promise to serve up the news of the day without any bias. But it was to opinion journalism what the Times’s reporting was supposed to be to news: honest and open to the world. The question was what the magazine’s 19th-century claim of intellectual independence – to be “of no party or clique” – should mean in the digital era. Those were the glory days of the blog, and we hit on the idea of creating a living op-ed page, a collective of bloggers with different points of view but a shared intellectual honesty who would argue out the meaning of the news of the day. They were brilliant, gutsy writers, and their disagreements were deep enough that I used to joke that my main work as editor was to prevent fistfights. The lessons we learned from adapting the Atlantic to the internet washed back into print. Under its owner, David Bradley, my colleagues and I distilled our purpose as publishing big arguments about big ideas. We made some mistakes – that goes along with any serious journalism ambitious to | ||
FBI analyst targeted in Kash Patel's book is placed on leave | ||
Tue, 15 Apr 2025 08:08:16 -0400
The FBI has placed an analyst on leave whose name was on a list of alleged "deep state" actors in a book written by FBI Director Kash Patel, two people familiar with the matter told NBC News. This was first reported by The New York Times. It’s unclear what reason the FBI gave for the move, and the agency declined to comment. Brian Auten, a Russia expert, was the employee who was placed on leave. He was also among the FBI employees former FBI Director Christopher Wray recommended for internal discipline over in connection with the 2017 investigation into links between Donald Trump as a presidential candidate and the Russian government. A later review by the Justice Department inspector general found no evidence that any FBI employee acted out of political bias in the Russia investigation. Patel included Auten on a list of roughly 60 alleged "deep state" actors in his 2023 book, "Government Gangsters." Patel denounced the FBI analyst by name, writing: “The fact that Auten was not fired from the FBI and prosecuted for his part in the Russia Gate conspiracy is a national embarrassment.” Patel also accused Auten of downplaying information found on the laptop of former President Joe Biden's son, Hunter Biden. Patel has disputed that the list in his book is an enemies list. Patel has his own links to the 2017 investigation into ties between Trump's 2016 campaign and the Russian government. At the start of Trump's first term, Patel worked for then-Rep. Devin Nunes, R-Calif., as a staffer on the GOP-led House Intelligence Committee. In that role, Patel wrote a memo accusing the FBI of making mistakes when it obtained a warrant to conduct surveillance of Carter Page, one of Trump's campaign advisers. Later in the first Trump administration, Patel served on the White House National Security Council. The Trump administration for months has targeted FBI officials who worked on prosecutions of Trump or those who rioted at the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021. In January, the Trump administration forced out six of the agency's senior executives and several heads of FBI field offices across the country. A letter sent to those who were fired said their removals were based on their roles in the Jan. 6 prosecutions. Later, in March, the Trump administration forced out the head of the FBI's New York field office after he urged employees to "dig in" in the wake of the January firings. Ken Dilanian is the justice and intelligence correspondent for NBC News, based in Washington. | ||
ISW calls Ukraine disabling over 20 Russian missiles with EW stations a turning point | ||
Mon, 14 Apr 2025 17:42:32 -0400
The disabling of over 20 missiles with the help of "active countermeasures by means of electronic warfare" may be a turning point in Ukraine’s electronic warfare capabilities. Source: Institute for the Study of War (ISW) Details: Military analysts say Ukrainian EW assets were usually credited with disabling Russian drones but not missile systems. ISW has previously assessed that Russia's strike campaign against Ukraine and Ukrainian adaptation to counter new Russian strike systems are part of a broader tactical and technological attack-defence race between long-range aviation and air defence capabilities. Yurii Ihnat, spokesman for the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, noted that the Russian missile strike on 13 January was similar to the strike that Russian forces launched on 8 January and in previous times. The Institute for the Study of War believes that Ihnat’s words indicate that Ukrainian forces can recognise patterns in repeated Russian attacks and, accordingly, introduce innovations and adapt to them. Earlier: Over 20 Russian missiles and drones failed to reach their targets during Russia's combined air attack on Ukraine on the morning of 13 January because they exploded mid-flight, landed in unpopulated areas, or met with an effective response from Ukrainian electronic warfare. To quote the ISW’s Key Takeaways on 13 January:
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The Invisible War: Inside the electronic warfare arms race that could shape course of war in Ukraine | ||
Mon, 14 Apr 2025 17:41:54 -0400
When Ukraine received Excalibur artillery shells in March 2022 from the U.S. shortly after the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it was immediately the military’s weapon of choice. Thanks to their GPS navigation system, these expensive munitions had a high-precision flight trajectory and could be used in urban combat. Fast forward one year to March 2023 and the Excaliburs suddenly started missing their targets. Russian electronic jamming, which overloads a receiver with noise or false information, was blocking the artillery shells’ GPS, causing the ammunition to miss its mark. Similar issues began to occur in April 2023 almost immediately following the delivery of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) guided aerial bombs and Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System GMLRS long-range missiles, which can be used with U.S-made High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS). To make matters even worse, Russian soldiers were also jamming communication with Ukrainian drones, causing both reconnaissance and strike drones to crash, land on the spot, or in the best case, return to base. In a war where both sides have relied heavily on the use of all types of drones — so much so that this war has been dubbed the “War of Drones” — Russia’s jamming capabilities have presented a major challenge on the front lines. Electronic jamming is just one example of electronic warfare (EW), an entire set of invisible weapons that use electronic means on air, sea, land, or space to obstruct and mislead enemy communications and electronically-guided weapons systems. EW systems vary in size and form, from pocket-sized devices to truck-mounted radar arrays and transceivers. They can be divided into several types, which differ in their purpose, including:
Depending on their operational range, EW can be divided into: tactical (up to 50 kilometers), operational-tactical (up to 500 kilometers), and strategic (over 500 kilometers). On the closest-range tactical level, there is also "trench EW" — radio-electronic devices that work up to 10 kilometers and are designed to cover small tactical groups from reconnaissance and FPV (first-person view) drones. Russia has traditionally invested heavily in growing its EW capabilities, with development placed into overdrive as the full-scale war against Ukraine continues. As the front lines have stabilized, its military has been able to place large numbers of its EW assets where they can have the greatest effect. In his controversial opinion piece for the Economist published in November 2023, now-former Commander-in-Chief Valerii Zaluzhnyi wrote that Russia’s superiority in the number of its EW assets was one of the main threats to the war turning positional, which is not in Ukraine’s favor. "Along the Kupiansk and Bakhmut axes, the enemy has effectively created a tiered system of electronic warfare, the elements of which constantly change their location," Zaluzhnyi wrote. Acknowledging the importance of achieving parity in EW, the Ukrainian government is also working to speed up the process to get new technologies onto the battlefield.
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Russia claims its deadly attack on Ukraine's Sumy targeted military forces as condemnation grows | ||
Mon, 14 Apr 2025 15:23:40 -0400
BRUSSELS (AP) — Russia on Monday claimed its deadly missile attack on Ukraine’s Sumy that killed and wounded scores including children had targeted a gathering of Ukrainian troops, while European leaders condemned the attack as a war crime. Ukrainian officials have said two ballistic missiles on Palm Sunday morning hit the heart of Sumy, a city about 30 kilometers (less than 20 miles) from Ukraine’s border with Russia, killing at least 34, including two children, and wounding 119. It was the second large-scale attack to claim civilian lives in Ukraine in just over a week. Asked about the attack, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Russia’s military only strikes military targets. Russia’s Defense Ministry said the strike targeted a gathering of senior military officers and accused Kyiv of using civilians as shields by holding military meetings in the city’s center. The ministry claimed to kill over 60 troops. Russia gave no evidence to back its claims. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has called for a global response to the attack, saying the first strike hit university buildings and the second exploded above street level. “Only real pressure on Russia can stop this. We need tangible sanctions against those sectors that finance the Russian killing machine,” he wrote Monday on social media. Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski, whose country holds the European Union’s rotating presidency, called the attacks “Russia’s mocking answer” to Kyiv’s agreement to a ceasefire proposed by the U.S. over a month ago. “I hope that President Trump, the U.S. administration, see that the leader of Russia is mocking their goodwill, and I hope the right decisions are taken,” Sikorski told reporters in Luxembourg, where EU foreign ministers met. Finnish Foreign Minister Elina Valtonen noted that the attack on Sumy came shortly after President Donald Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff, was in Saint Petersburg for talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin. It demonstrates that “Russia shows full disregard for the peace process, but also that Russia has zero regard for human life,” Valtonen said. Lithuania’s foreign minister, Kestutis Budrys, echoed Ukraine’s assertion that the Russian strike used cluster munitions to target civilians, calling it “a war crime by definition.” The Associated Press has been unable to verify that claim. French Foreign Minister Jean-Noël Barrot said the attack shows that Putin has no intention of agreeing to a ceasefire, and called for the European Union to “take the toughest sanctions against Russia to suffocate its economy and prevent it from fueling its war effort.” The EU has imposed 16 rounds of sanctions on Russia and is working on a 17th, but the measures are getting harder to agree on because they also impact European economies. Germany’s chancellor-designate, Friedrich Merz, described the Sumy attack as “a serious war crime” during an appearance on ARD television. Merz made clear he stands by his past calls to send Taurus long-range cruise missiles to Ukraine, something that outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz refused to do. He said the Ukrainian military needs to be able to “get ahead of the situation” and that any delivery of long-range missiles must be done in consultation with European partners. Asked about Merz’s statement, the Kremlin spokesman said such a move would “inevitably lead only to further escalation of the situation around Ukraine,” telling reporters that “regrettably, European capitals aren’t inclined to search for ways to launch peace talks and are inclined instead to keep provoking the continuation of the war.” Russian forces this month have dropped 2,800 air bombs on Ukraine and fired more than 1,400 strike drones and nearly 60 missiles of various types. The attack on Sumy followed a April 4 missile strike on Zelenskyy’s hometown of Kryvyi Rih that killed some 20 people, including nine children. Trump has previously described the strike on Sumy as a “mistake.” On Monday, he said the mistake was allowing the war to start in the first place, criticizing former President Joe Biden, Zelenskyy and Putin. “Biden could’ve stopped it and Zelenskyy could’ve stopped it and Putin should’ve never started it,” Trump said in the Oval Office. “Everybody’s to blame.” Late Sunday, Russian exploding drones attacked Odesa, injuring eight people. Regional head Oleh Kiper said a medical facility was among the buildings damaged. Russia fired a total of 62 Shahed drones over Ukraine late Sunday and early Monday, Ukraine’s air force said, adding that 40 were destroyed and 11 others jammed. Two Chinese nationals, who were captured by Ukrainian forces while fighting on the Russian side, said at a news conference in Kyiv on Monday that they had joined the war voluntarily after seeing recruitment announcements on TikTok. They said they weren’t encouraged or supported by Chinese authorities, who had warned them about the danger of participating in the conflict. One of the men, speaking through an interpreter, said he did not intend to take part directly in combat but was sent to the front lines anyway. Another said that Russian recruiters abused his trust and put him in what he described as a “trap.” They said they were given orders through gestures and hand signals, and Russian personnel constantly accompanied them, leaving no chance for escape. Both said they hope to be included in a future prisoner exchange and return to their families. It was impossible for the AP to corroborate their statements or independently verify under what circumstances the two men spoke. When he first announced the capture of the Chinese nationals last week, Zelensky said there were more than 150 other Chinese fighting for Russia. Beijing responded that it always asks its citizens to avoid participating in any military operations. While China has provided strong diplomatic support for Russia since it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it is not believed to have knowingly provided Russia with troops, weapons or military expertise. U.S. officials have accused Iran of providing Russia with drones, while American and South Korean officials say North Korea has sent thousands of troops to help Russia on the battlefield. ___ Associated Press writers Chris Megerian in Washington, Geir Moulson in Berlin, Sam McNeil in Barcelona, Spain, Hanna Arhirova and Illia Novikov in Kyiv, Ukraine, and Dasha Litvinova in Tallinn, Estonia, contributed to this report. ___ Follow AP’s coverage of the war in Ukraine at https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine | ||
Roman Rozhavsky Named Assistant Director of FBI Counterintelligence Division Following Decades of Operational Leadership - HS Today | ||
Mon, 14 Apr 2025 08:23:35 -0400
Roman Rozhavsky has officially taken the helm as Assistant Director of the FBI’s Counterintelligence Division, bringing with him more than 18 years of deep operational experience, strategic leadership, and a career dedicated to protecting U.S. national security, according to an announcement on his LinkedIn. Rozhavsky, who began his FBI service in 2006, has steadily climbed the ranks through some of the Bureau’s most critical and complex assignments in counterintelligence, insider threat detection, and high-stakes investigations involving foreign adversaries. His appointment to Assistant Director follows a brief but impactful term as Special Agent in Charge of the Counterintelligence Division at the FBI’s Washington Field Office, where he oversaw all CI investigations in the capital region. Prior to this latest promotion, Rozhavsky led a range of sensitive and high-impact operations. As Section Chief from 2023 to 2024, he managed all FBI efforts to detect insider threats across the U.S. government — including espionage, mishandling of classified material, and unauthorized media leaks. Under his leadership, the Bureau advanced several high-profile prosecutions and dismantled networks targeting critical national security infrastructure. Earlier roles included serving as Assistant Special Agent in Charge in New York, where he directed counterintelligence operations targeting China, Iran, and other foreign actors. He also spent several years as Unit Chief overseeing investigations into the illegal acquisition of U.S. technology and intellectual property by the Chinese government. Rozhavsky has been a key player in building and strengthening the FBI’s counterintelligence posture nationwide. As Deputy Director of the National Counterintelligence Task Force in 2019, he helped create a nationwide framework for integrating federal, state, and local efforts against foreign intelligence threats. Rozhavsky’s operational resume is backed by time spent on the front lines. As a Supervisory Special Agent and, before that, a Special Agent in the FBI’s Houston Field Office, he investigated espionage, technology transfer, economic espionage, and counterproliferation cases. He also served on Houston’s Enhanced SWAT Team, giving him tactical experience in high-risk operations. From 2014 to 2021, he also taught advanced counterintelligence courses as an adjunct faculty member at the FBI Academy in Quantico and at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, helping shape the next generation of CI professionals. He holds a master’s degree in international relations and national security from St. Mary’s University and a bachelor’s degree in computer science from Seattle University. Rozhavsky’s work continues to make headlines. Recently, he played a role in the successful conviction of two Eastern European organized crime leaders hired by the Iranian government to assassinate U.S.-based journalist Masih Alinejad. The defendants — acting on behalf of Iran — conspired to carry out the murder-for-hire plot on U.S. soil using an assault rifle. “The defendants participated in a brazen plot to kill an Iranian American dissident in New York who criticized the regime in Iran,” Rozhavsky said after the verdict. “Thanks to the good work of the FBI and our partners, their plan failed. This verdict demonstrates the FBI will not tolerate Iran’s attempts to threaten, silence, or harm American citizens.” Matt Seldon, BSc., is an Editorial Associate with HSToday. He has over 20 years of experience in writing, social media, and analytics. Matt has a degree in Computer Studies from the University of South Wales in the UK. His diverse work experience includes positions at the Department for Work and Pensions and various responsibilities for a wide variety of companies in the private sector. He has been writing and editing various blogs and online content for promotional and educational purposes in his job roles since first entering the workplace. Matt has run various social media campaigns over his career on platforms including Google, Microsoft, Facebook and LinkedIn on topics surrounding promotion and education. His educational campaigns have been on topics including charity volunteering in the public sector and personal finance goals. | ||
Why Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Love Affair with the Ottoman Empire Should Worry The World | ||
Sat, 12 Apr 2025 11:56:53 -0400
At the end of August, Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan celebrated the Islamic New Year with aplomb. Fresh off his conversion of the monumental Haghia Sophia to a mosque, he converted another former Byzantine church, the fourth-century Chora church, one of Istanbul’s oldest Byzantine structures. The day after that he announced the largest ever natural gas depository in the Black Sea. This followed another recent discovery of natural gas fields in the eastern Mediterranean. Both of these areas are hotly contested zones of international competition between the powers around these seas. Later that week he welcomed a delegation of Hamas to Ankara, where he expressed support for Palestinians in the wake of the recent announcement of an agreement between Israel and the UAE. All of these moves project Erdogan’s vision of Islamist strength into the world. Standing up for Islam at home goes hand in hand with securing natural resources and imposing Turkey’s power abroad. It also goes hand in hand with domestic repression. The Islamic New Year saw Erdogan further tighten his grip on social media freedom and consider pulling Turkey out of what is known, now farcically, as the 2011 Istanbul Convention, a treaty of the Council of Europe that commits countries to protecting women from domestic violence. Democratic peoples in Turkey, the Middle East, and around the world should worry. Much has been written about Erdogan’s attempts to “resurrect” the Ottoman Empire or to style himself a sultan. There is truth here. But to understand Erdogan’s political agenda and horizon we must be specific about which Ottoman sultan Erdogan strives to be. It is the empire’s ninth sultan, Selim I. Selim died 500 years ago in 1520. It was during his lifetime that the Ottoman Empire grew from a strong regional power to a gargantuan global empire. For Erdogan, this sultan from half a millennium ago serves his contemporary needs. Selim in many ways functions as Erdogan’s Andrew Jackson, a figure from the past of symbolic use in the present. Selim offers a template for Turkey to become a global political and economic power, with influence from Washington to Beijing, crushing foreign and domestic challengers alike. He helps Erdogan too to make his case for Islam as a cultural and political reservoir of strength, a vital component of the glories of the Ottoman past, which he seeks to emulate in contemporary Turkey against the dominant elite secularism that has reigned since its founding. We should be wary of Erdogan’s embrace of Selim’s exclusionary vision of Turkish political power. It represents a historical example of strongman politics that led to regional wars, the attempted annihilation of religious minorities, and the monopolization of global economic resources. In addition to his attempts to monopolize natural gas reserves around Turkey, today this takes the form of Erdogan’s foreign military ventures in Libya, Syria, and Yemen. At home, he has gone after Turkey’s Shiite community, Kurds, intellectuals, Christians, journalists, women, and leftists. Erdogan cultivates his own Sunni religiosity to position Islam at the center of Turkey’s domestic agenda, with the church conversions the most potent recent symbols of this. Erdogan’s represents a political logic of zero-sum competition that pits Turkey against Saudi Arabia and Iran for control of the region and over claims of global Islamic leadership. Erdogan likes Selim because he made Turkish global political power possible. From 1517 through the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire maintained the geographic shape Selim won for it, dominating the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean. In 1517, the Ottomans defeated their major rival in the region, the Mamluk Empire based in Cairo, capturing all of its territory in the Middle East and North Africa. This more than doubled the empire’s size. This explosion of the Ottoman Empire into the Middle East turned it into the region’s foremost military and political power and one of the world’s largest states. The Ottomans now controlled the entire eastern half of the Mediterranean and thus dominated the globe’s most important trade routes overland between Europe and Asia and by sea through the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. The Turkish Republic inherited much of that power after the empire’s demise and the republic’s rise in 1923. While every modern Turkish ruler has distanced himself from the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, and Islam, to attempt to project a more “western,” “secular,” and “modern” face for the republic, Erdogan is the first who has actively embraced the Ottoman past and the empire’s Islamic heritage. Here too Selim proves key to Erdogan’s image of his rule. Selim’s defeat of the Mamluks made the Ottoman Empire a majority Muslim state for the first time in its history, after over two hundred years of being a state whose population was mostly Greek Orthodox. With this victory, Selim became the first Ottoman sultan to rule Mecca and Medina, Islam’s holiest cities, thus earning the title of caliph and cementing the empire’s global Islamic credentials. If Selim was the first Ottoman to be both sultan and caliph, Erdogan is the first republican leader to profess to possessing both titles. Like President Donald Trump’s purposeful deployment of the symbols of Andrew Jackson—prominently displaying his portrait in the Oval Office and defending his statues—Erdogan has trafficked publicly and specifically in the symbolic politics of Selim in Turkey. His most striking act was to name the recently constructed third bridge over the famous Bosphorus Strait after Selim. Erdogan has also lavished enormous resources on Selim’s tomb and other memorials to his rule. After winning a 2017 constitutional referendum that greatly expanded his powers—a process marred by irregularities—Erdogan made his first public appearance at Selim’s tomb. Staged as a kind of pilgrimage, there Erdogan returned to the long-dead sovereign his kaftan and turban that had been stolen years before. This far-from-subtle first act after winning a referendum that gave him near-limitless power made clear who Erdogan’s role model is. Erdogan and his Islamist party colleagues regularly describe themselves as the “grandchildren” of the Ottomans. In this very pointed genealogy, Erdogan purposefully skips a generation—that of Turkey’s republican fathers since 1923—to leapfrog back in time to when the Ottomans ruled the globe with their particular brand of Turkish Sunni politics, to Selim’s day when wars and domestic repression led to wealth and territorial power. Recreating a political program akin to Selim’s is a dangerous prospect for Turkey and the Middle East and indeed the world. To make Turkey Ottoman again requires the kind of violence, censorship, and vitriol that Erdogan has indeed shown himself ready to use. The universal lesson here is that calls for returns to perceived greatness, whether in Turkey or in United States, selectively embrace controversial historical figures, mangle their history, and elevate hatred and division. | ||
Antalya Forum Reveals Türkiye’s Evolving Diplomacy | ||
Sat, 12 Apr 2025 11:22:45 -0400
2024-03-23
The Antalya Diplomacy Forum is a major platform for Türkiye’s efforts to strengthen its diplomatic influence. It plays an important role in strengthening Turkish diplomatic capabilities, and has come to constitute a basic pillar in Ankara’s “conference diplomacy” at the national level, with domestic implications for Türkiye too. A close analysis of the participants and the topics discussed also reveals much about the dominant trends and themes in Turkish foreign policy. The Forum, whose third (2024) edition was held at the Nest Convention Center near Antalya from March 1-3, gathered leaders and policy makers from across the world to provide a space for discussions to address global challenges and enhance mutual understanding. The forum also promotes Türkiye’s growing role in regional and global affairs, and its ability to build relationships between different countries around the world. Türkiye has shown itself to be well suited to playing a greater role in promoting constructive engagement and international cooperation. The Antalya Diplomacy Forum represents a manifestation of this trend and Türkiye’s endeavors to play a greater role internationally. Section 1: The Creation and Development of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum A) Why Antalya? Antalya was chosen as the host city for the first, 2021 edition of the Forum for several reasons. It enjoys a strategic location on the Mediterranean coast, a bridge linking Europe, Asia and Africa, and provides easy access for participants. Antalya’s rich and diverse historical heritage makes it a poignant location for an international diplomatic conference, and its advanced infrastructure is well-suited to accommodating large international events smoothly and professionally. The fact that Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu, who was Turkish foreign minister at the time, hails from nearby Alanya confirms the importance of Antalya province within Turkish diplomatic circles. Antalya’s reputation as a popular tourist destination also contributes to the government’s broader goals of strengthening its international relations. This facet has helped the government organize various global forums such as a recent symposium on nurturing economic development and improving international relations. This chimes with the Forum’s strategic objectives of promoting diplomacy, economic development and political harmony among participating countries. B) Forums as a Diplomatic Tool Diplomatic forums can play a significant role as platforms for discussing contemporary international issues and promoting dialogue between countries. Prominent examples include the World Economic Forum in Davos, the Munich Security Conference and the World Public Forum - Dialogue of Civilizations. Such events attract political heavyweights and business leaders. The Antalya Forum aims to attract a more diverse range of attendees including students, academics, senior civil servants and ministers, along with senior government figures up to and including heads of state and government. Such diversity fosters wide-ranging discussions at the forum and encourages the exchange of ideas from diverse perspectives. The participation of academics and students from across Türkiye also adds academic depth to the forum, enriching discussions and nurturing a sense of responsibility among the youth as concerns Türkiye’s future. In addition, the forum focuses on dialogue between various sectors of society and efforts to address global challenges comprehensively, by bringing together individuals and groups from academia, government and civil society. The Antalya Forum also allows participants to voice criticism and propose tangible solutions, as it provides a platform for voices from the Global South, allowing them to challenge Western hegemony and express alternative viewpoints. C) First and Second Editions The first and second Antalya forums attracted a large number of participants from diverse regions of the world. They provided a useful platform for constructive dialogue and cooperation on urgent global issues. Over 1,000 delegates attend the first edition in June 2021, with 17 sessions on the theme of “Innovative Diplomacy: New Era, New Approaches”. Based on this success, the second conference was organised in March 2022 under the title “Recoding Diplomacy” and attracted even more people - 3,260 registered participants from 75 countries, including 17 heads of state and government, 80 ministers, diplomats, business executives, journalists, and academics. The third edition took place in March 2024 under the title “Advancing Diplomacy in Times of Turmoil”. This time, it included 52 sessions and attracted even more participants, from 147 countries. Each year, the Forum expands its scope, improves its content and attracts more participants, reflecting a commitment to continuous improvement. Throughout its history so far, the Forum has addressed a wide range of issues, from regional conflicts such as those in Syria and Yemen, to global economic challenges in the wake of the financial crisis. Climate change has emerged as a core element of the Forum’s agenda, highlighting the need for collective action to mitigate its impacts and promote sustainability and environmental protection. The forum has also hosted discussions on strengthening international cooperation on counter-terrorism while supporting human rights and civil liberties. Section 2: The Antalya Diplomacy Forum and Türkiye’s Foreign Policy The principal value of the gathering from an analytical perspective is that it provides an insight into current trends in Türkiye’s foreign policy. Indeed, Türkiye uses the Antalya Diplomacy Forum as a tool to communicate its foreign policy agenda to the world. The 2024 edition revealed several Turkish priorities and dynamics, as follows. A) The Return of “Zero Problems with the Neighbors” Türkiye’s policy of “zero problems with the neighbors” historically aimed to improve and strengthen its relations with its regional and global counterparts. However, this policy was compromised in the complex fallout of the Arab Spring uprisings, which forced Türkiye to reevaluate its position. Since 2021 however, Ankara has sought to realign its foreign policy course by reviving the concept, with a focus on avoiding conflict and prioritizing cooperation and development. The Antalya forum is a useful tool in this regard, allowing the Turkish government to communicate with various actors and express its diplomatic goals within this framework. A central element in Türkiye’s new foreign policy approach is a focus on normalization of relations. Ankara is seeking to repair ties with neighboring countries and establish new partnerships at the global level. Through the Antalya gathering, Türkiye is able to engage in both direct and indirect diplomatic dialogue, strength mutual understanding and explore means of cooperation. B) Tackling Regional Crises Recent regional crises - including Türkiye’s economic downturn, the coronavirus pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine - have significantly impacted Türkiye’s foreign policy. These challenges have negatively impacted Türkiye’s regional influence, necessitating a re-evaluation of its strategies and diplomatic relations. In this context, the Antalya Diplomacy Forum has emerged as an important initiative for addressing Türkiye’s crises. By providing a platform for diplomatic engagement and dialogue, the gathering provides Ankara with an opportunity to strengthen its diplomatic relations with other countries, and to enhance its influence and status globally. Section 3: International Participation A) Regional and International Presence The third Antalya Diplomacy Forum demonstrated the growing reach of Türkiye’s foreign policy, attracting more than 5,000 participants from 147 countries. Prominent figures, including 19 heads of state and 73 ministers, took part in diplomatic meetings during the event. Prominent participants included Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov; Ersin Tatar, the president of the breakaway Turkish-backed republic of Northern Cyprus; South Africa’s Minister of International Relations Naledi Pandor; Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary; and Sameh Shoukry, Egypt’s Foreign Minister. That said, Western representation in the Forum was noticeably lacking compared with other regions. While a strong cohort came from the Balkan countries, heads of state and ministers from major Western powers such as the United States, Britain, France, and Germany were noticeably absent. This could be for several reasons, but one appears to be the continued opposition of Western countries to the foreign policy of Türkiye, which is striving to carve out a position relatively independent from that of the Western camp. B) African Presence The conference attracted a large African presence. This reflects the continent’s increasing importance in Turkish foreign policy. Ankara is making strenuous efforts to strengthen its relations with African countries and expand its influence on the continent, investing in long-term ties and strengthening both defense and trade relations with African states. Indeed, Turkish relations with African countries have witnessed a qualitative leap since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) took power. In 2002, Türkiye only had official diplomatic relations with seven countries in Africa. Thanks to the AKP’s policy of diplomatic outreach, this number has rapidly increased, and today it has relations with 49 out of the 54 countries on the continent recognized by the United Nations. Türkiye has embassies in 45 of these states, and has exchanged consulates with the remaining four. This engagement has yielded results at various levels. The volume of Turkish-African trade has increased dramatically from only $5.4 billion in 2003 to more than $40.7 billion by the end of 2022. Over the same period, Turkish companies have implemented huge projects in Africa, with a total value exceeding $82 billion, while direct Turkish investments in the continent have topped $10 billion. Turkish-African collaboration is also very diverse, spanning vital industries such as agriculture, energy, mining, light and medium industrial, transportation, and communications. Turkey is also promoting cooperation with African countries in areas such as education, health, the environment, culture, and tourism. C) Arab Presence There was a significant Arab presence at the forum, reflecting Türkiye’s return to its previous approach of engagement with Arab countries, which Ankara sees as its geographical depth as well as a vital important economic market. Türkiye began a trend of opening up to Arab countries around 15 years ago, scrapping entry visas for most of them, which sparked an influx of Arab tourists. Ankara also boosted its trade ties with Arab countries, and its humanitarian and cultural presence in many of them. However, this engagement rapidly declined due to the wave of instability across the region, which dragged Türkiye into regional rivalries and led to the deterioration of its political and economic relations with various countries across the region. However, the significant Arab presence at the Antalya conference indicates that Türkiye is shifting back towards its “zero problems” policy and working to resolve its main problems with Arab countries. Section 4: Major Themes of Discussion The Antalya Diplomacy Forum serves as a crucial platform for Türkiye to enhance its foreign relations and foster open channels of dialogue. President Erdoğan had discussions with 11 heads of state on the sidelines of the gathering, while Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan held meetings with 32 of his counterparts from around the world. The forum facilitated conversations on a wide range of urgent international topics, including conflict in the region. The forum also addressed important economic concerns, including the fallout from the global financial crisis and the need to combat climate change. These conversations emphasized the importance of working together and making concerted attempts to overcome these challenges. Among the most prominent issues addressed at the forum: 1) The War in Gaza The ongoing war in Gaza was a central topic at the 2024 forum. President Erdoğan and Foreign Minister Fidan spoke frankly about Israel’s genocidal campaign there during the forum’s opening session. Erdoğan said recognition of the Palestinian state was the only way to repay the international community’s moral debt to Palestine. Foreign Minister Fidan also focused his speech on Gaza, linking the Gaza war to the crisis of the international system. “The unfolding events in Gaza is the most evident sign of the legitimacy crisis of the international system,” he said. “The snapshot of Gaza today displays a catastrophic moment where the hypocrisy of the international system cannot be concealed.” He added that Türkiye would continue to strive to bring about a change in the nature of the international system. The forum was a space for many informal sessions and discussions on the conflict in Gaza, particualrly focusing on Turkish mediation and ceasefire proposals. That said, more analysis could be conducted on how the forum could facilitate mediation efforts to end the conflict. The forum attempted to provide a constructive platform for dialogue between Palestinian factions Hamas and Fatah, as the Turkish government attempts to mediate between them. 2) The War in Ukraine The war in Ukraine was another major topic at the Antalya forum, including at official meetings held on its sidelines. Notably, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov discussed the war with his Turkish counterpart Fidan. The war was also a major focus of President Erdoğan’s keynote speech and of most of the other speeches and sessions, especially those related to food security. 3) The Syrian Crisis The forum included a special session to discuss the Syrian crisis, attended by the UN’s Special Envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen, the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Syria Crisis, Muhannad Hadi, and the chairman of the opposition Syrian Negotiating Committee, Dr Bader Jamous. Russia and Iran were notably absent. The fact a session was scheduled to discuss the situation in Syria reflected its importance on the Turkish foreign policy agenda, and the subject is likely to be high on that agenda after Turkish municipal elections at the end of March. 4) Global Food Security Food security became a pressing issue globally in the wake of the coronavirus pandemic, and this dynamic became more acute after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which disrupted supply chains around the world. The forum held a special session on food security, where several senior international officials discussed the global food security crisis, its causes and possible mechanisms for tackling it. Section 5: Looking to the Future A number of predictions can be made regarding the future of the Antalya Diplomacy Forum and its role in shaping Turkish diplomacy. Türkiye is likely to continue holding the forum on a regular basis, and to leverage it to enhance its position and influence in global affairs. The forum serves as an important platform for Türkiye to engage with international stakeholders, address pressing global issues, and present its diplomatic initiatives to a diverse audience. Moreover, it is possible that more international actors will take part in the forum in the coming years, especially if relations between Türkiye and the West improve. If Western countries can take part in the Forum, international actors may show more interest. More engagement would enrich the discussions, broaden the perspectives and foster greater cooperation on global challenges. Türkiye is however likely to maintain its focus on prioritizing engagement with Africa. The forum provides a means for Türkiye to deepen its economic cooperation and explore new avenues for partnership and development on the continent. By investing in Africa’s stability and prosperity, Türkiye aims to expand its influence there while contributing to regional development. Conclusion The Antalya Diplomacy Forum has quickly become a major event in the Turkish diplomatic calendar, and is gaining prominence both domestically and internationally. Through its various sessions and informal debates, the conference plays an important role in strengthening Turkish diplomacy. Foreign Minister Fidan’s focus on the importance of countries within the region managing the region’s affairs embodies the spirit of the forum. It highlights the possibility of emerging regional powers becoming central actors in resolving regional crises, in contrast with the dictates of traditional great powers. Moreover, the institutional formula of the forum, its continuity and government backing give it an advantage, enabling it to transcend individuals and political affiliations to become a pillar of Türkiye’s diplomatic endeavors as a state. That said, potential shifts in Türkiye’s power dynamics could shift the emphasis and identity of the forum. The selection of the highly diverse touristic province of Antalya as the forum’s venue reflects a desire to promote diverse viewpoints. Participants from both developed and developing countries have contributed to enriching the discussions and promoting innovative solutions to the issues being considered. Informal engagement and back-door diplomacy are also a major part of the value of the forum, adding to the formal discussion panels. President Erdoğan’s call for a multipolar world order and emphasis on the importance of diplomacy in overcoming the challenges of the 21st century resonated deeply in the forum’s discourse. This could gain currency as a result of the crises the international system is currently struggling to resolve, most notably the catatrophe in Gaza. As the West’s pull as a global power center declines, Global South players grow in influence and the polarization between Russia and China on the one hand and the West on the other deepens, Türkiye is emerging as a rising diplomatic power. The Antalya Diplomacy Forum is one of the tools as its disposal to achieve stability in the areas surrounding it, from Syria to Ukraine, Somlia to Karabakh, and the Eastern Mediterranean in general.
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Thu, 10 Apr 2025 10:14:07 -0400
FIRST ON FOX: Former Democratic Rep. Anthony Weiner received surprising donations to his campaign for City Council of New York City from ex-wife Huma Abedin and her sister, Heba Abedin, despite his ex-wife saying in 2021 that Weiner's sex scandals "almost killed her." Huma Abedin donated $175 to Weiner's campaign March 13, and her sister, Heba Abedin, donated $150 Dec. 29, 2024, a Fox News Digital review of New York City campaign finance reports revealed. Weiner launched his latest campaign for NYC City Council, a position he held from 1992 to 1998 before controversy derailed his political career, in December 2024. Weiner was elected to represent New York's 9th Congressional District in 1998 and resigned in 2011 after he posted a photo of himself in his underwear on social media. The incident was followed by years of sexual scandals, and Weiner was charged with transferring obscene material to a minor in May 2017 after sexting a 15-year-old girl. He was sentenced to 21 months in prison. Former Democratic Rep. Anthony Weiner, right, received donations to his campaign for City Council of New York City from ex-wife Huma Abedin and her sister, Heba Abedin, according to campaign finance reports. (Getty) Huma Abedin, the longtime Hillary Clinton aide, told CBS "Sunday Morning" in 2021 that anger over her husband's sex scandals almost killed her. ANTHONY WEINER SPOTTED DINING WITH ESTRANGED WIFE HUMA ABEDIN "I can't live in that space anymore. I tried that. It almost killed me," Abedin told Norah O'Donnell. Abedin said she filed for divorce on the same day Weiner pleaded guilty and was sentenced to prison. The former couple, who co-parent their son, were spotted in 2023 attending the Inner Circle charity show at Ziegfeld Theater in Midtown Manhattan. President Joe Biden, right, presents the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the nation's highest civilian honor, to Alex Soros on behalf of his father, George Soros, in the East Room of the White House Jan. 4, 2025, in Washington. (AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta) By July 2024, Abedin announced on social media she was engaged to Alex Soros, chairman of Open Society Foundations and son of billionaire megadonor George Soros. They are expected to get married this summer. After resigning from Congress in 2011, Weiner continued sexting under the pseudonym "Carlos Danger." The main recipient, Sydney Leathers, who was 22 at the time, claimed the former lawmaker referred to himself as "an argumentative, perpetually horny middle-aged man." Anthony Weiner, a former Democratic congressman, leaves federal court in New York Sept. 25, 2017, after being sentenced to 21 months for sexting with a 15-year-old girl. (Timothy A. Clary/AFP via Getty Images) Weiner attempted his first political comeback in 2013 with a mayoral run, but his reputation was damaged by new revelations of explicit photos Weiner had sent under the pseudonym. Weiner was caught in another sexting scandal in 2016, which led to his indictment. In one image Weiner sent, he was lying in bed with his young son. More claims surfaced that year that Weiner had sexted a 15-year-old girl in North Carolina, and his laptop was seized. Investigators found emails relevant to Clinton's classified documents scandal that dominated the 2016 election. Weiner later checked himself into rehab for sex addiction. In 2017, his federal indictment ruined another bid for mayor. He was released in 2019 and was ordered to register as a sex offender. CLICK HERE TO GET THE FOX NEWS APP Abedin and Weiner did not respond to Fox News Digital's request for comment by the deadline of this article. Fox News Digital's Michael Dorgan and Charles Creitz contributed to this report. Deirdre Heavey is a politics writer for Fox News Digital. | ||
The mysterious novelist who foresaw Putin’s Russia – and then came to symbolise its moral decay | ||
Tue, 08 Apr 2025 15:52:29 -0400
Fiction has a habit of coming to life in Russia. On the evening of 2 April 2023, the military blogger Vladlen Tatarsky appeared at an event in St Petersburg organised by Cyber Front Z, a group of semi-professional keyboard warriors who boost Kremlin war propaganda online. With more than half a million followers, Tatarsky was a mid-tier celebrity on Telegram, the social media app that has become a hub of Russian news and political debate. As guests mingled, a young woman with long, salon-waved blond hair approached Tatarsky. She presented him with an unusual gift: a gold-painted statue of himself. About two minutes later, the statue exploded, killing Tatarsky and injuring 42 people. The blond woman – 26-year-old St Petersburg native Darya Trepova – was arrested the next day. She said she had believed the statue contained a listening device, not a bomb, and that she had acted on orders from a man in Ukraine she knew only as “Gestalt”. Trepova was an unlikely killer. A vegan feminist who had dropped out of medical school and worked at a vintage clothing store, she had been arrested at an anti-war protest in February 2022 and held for 10 days. Not only was there nothing to suggest that she would carry out an assassination, Tatarsky was an odd target, a bellicose social media influencer without real power. Trepova was sentenced to 27 years in prison for her crime. Absurd yet disturbing, memorable yet baffling, the incident seemed straight out of a story by Victor Olegovich Pelevin, one of Russia’s most famous living writers. In at least one respect, the connection between fiction and reality was direct: “Vladlen Tatarsky” was not the military blogger’s real name, but a nom de plume inspired by the hero of Pelevin’s 1999 novel Generation P. The notoriously reclusive Pelevin did not comment on Tatarsky’s assassination – he hasn’t communicated with the press since 2010 – but his most recent novel, Cool, published in late 2024, closed the circle of reference. The novel featured a perverse caricature of Darya Trepova as Darya Troedyrkina, a castrating feminist tasked with assassinating a male dictator. Her last name means “three holes”. Once the brightest star of Russia’s post-Soviet literary scene, Pelevin has retreated into an ideological hall of mirrors, writing elaborate satires of gender and authoritarianism while avoiding direct engagement with Russian politics. The real-life Trepova, however misguided, was motivated by her indignation at Russia’s war; Pelevin made her into an anti-feminist joke. At a time when many of his literary peers have fled Russia for political reasons, Pelevin’s descent from dazzling young writer to misogynist crank mirrors the decline of mainstream Russian culture in a new era of authoritarian censorship. Pelevin started publishing fiction just as Soviet censorship was crumbling thanks to Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost, or openness. He soon became famous for edgy, hallucinogenic stories that could never have been published under the old Soviet system. By the time Generation P came out, he was already acclaimed not only in Russia, but in the US and throughout Europe. With its puns, postmodern games, and vigorous mixture of high and low culture, his work chimed with larger trends in global literature. The Times Literary Supplement described him as “a Russian David Foster Wallace, Will Self, Haruki Murakami”. According to Time, he was the “psychedelic Nabokov of the cyber age”. More than this, Pelevin’s writing seemed to provide an ever more accurate guide to the new workings of Russian power. Generation P imagines advertising, television and politics as the key tools that corrupt, secretive interests use to create a false reality. The novel’s hero, Vavilen Tatarsky, is an aspiring poet whose literary ambitions are scrambled by the Soviet collapse. In the free-for-all of newly capitalist Russia, Tatarsky goes into advertising, “translating” American slogans into Russian ones. (“Gucci for Men: Be a European, smell better.”) In typical Pelevinian fashion, this over-the-top satire of an already-over-the-top reality soon transmogrifies into an occult, psychedelic fantasy. High on mushrooms, Vavilen discovers that the Russian government is a virtual reality scripted by writers, acting in service of the Mesopotamian goddess Ishtar. Vavilen gets a job scripting Russia’s simulacrum of democracy. Soon he’s writing lines for Yeltsin and for the oligarch Boris Berezovsky, who treats Russia as his own private Monopoly board. The novel remains one of the best literary snapshots of the precarious, delirious, grimly hilarious mood of 1990s Moscow. Published in the US as Homo Zapiens and in the UK as Babylon, it has sold more than 3.5m copies worldwide. Pelevin has long been lauded as a kind of soothsayer who predicted Russia’s post-truth, neo-imperial present. Fans believe that his novels foretold the rise of Putinist coercive political spectacle and the descent of post-Soviet Russia into a sham democracy (Generation P); Russia’s engineering of a 2014 rebellion in eastern Ukraine and its full-scale invasion in 2022 (in S.N.U.F.F., published in 2011); and even the rise of Chat GPT (in iPhuck 10, from 2017). Pelevin’s avid readers include the notorious Vladislav Surkov, who worked as a leading Kremlin spin doctor from 1999 until 2014. Like the assassinated military blogger, Surkov is a Pelevin fan who resembles a character from a Pelevin novel: a would-be writer turned ad man turned political puppet master, who helped fashion Russia’s descent into ultra-cynical, media-driven virtual politics in the 2010s. Pelevin’s oracular quality has been heightened by his total absence from public life. Even when someone announced his death online in 2016, he did not come forward to offer a correction. This erstwhile prophet is so elusive that rumours have swirled that he has been replaced by a neural network or a team of ghostwriters. As his fellow writer Dmitry Bykov once put it: “No one knows where Pelevin lives – because Pelevin lives on the astral plane.” His only communications are through his annual novels. In Russia, a new one appears every fall amid a flurry of press. Over the past decade, many of Pelevin’s peers have left Russia out of fear or disgust at intensifying censorship, political repression and the assault on Ukraine. They have been declared foreign agents, put on wanted lists, arrested in absentia, stripped of publishing contracts, rejected by booksellers. Bykov suffered an apparent poisoning in 2019, which bore similarities to the poisoning of opposition leader Alexei Navalny. He now lives in the US, and booksellers in Russia are reluctant to sell his work. Pelevin, on the other hand, has managed to escape government censure, and his books continue to sell well. His place of residence is a closely guarded secret – even the continent is uncertain – but there is no reason to believe that he left Russia out of fear for his own safety. His precise position on the political spectrum is also something of a mystery. But his failure to choose a side on the war in Ukraine has earned him the antipathy, even contempt, of anti-war Russian writers and critics. In the view of one Russian literary critic, Pelevin has become a pro-Putin writer whose popular fiction is a “horrible cocktail of postmodernism and fascism” that recruits supporters for the regime. But Pelevin’s work also includes mockery of Russian ultranationalist philosophy and a clear hatred for authoritarianism. Rather than actively supporting Putin, he advocates a philosophy of all-encompassing cynicism that invalidates any hope of political change. This, it seems, is part of the reason he continues to be so popular in his homeland. Pelevin’s Russian editor and agent are under strict orders not to comment on any aspect of his personal life. Fans debate whether he lives in Berlin or London, Thailand, Korea or Japan. He has never had any social media presence. Since the early 1990s, he has hidden behind his trademark sunglasses; even when he was included in a New Yorker portrait of the six best young novelists in 1998, he refused to remove them for a photo by Richard Avedon. He has not allowed himself to be photographed in public since 2001 and has not given an interview to a journalist since 2010. The basic facts of Pelevin’s early years are a matter of public record, at least. As a young child, he lived in a communal apartment in central Moscow, sharing a single room with his parents, before the family moved to their own apartment in a newly built high-rise complex on the outskirts of the city. He had an exceptional memory, but he was not a particularly good student. He trained as an engineer and worked for a while servicing trams. A friend and former colleague once recalled how he and Pelevin spent their spare time making fake Japanese figurines, “ageing” them with acid and selling them on the street. Pelevin had become fascinated with Buddhism when he was a boy, studying it through Soviet atheism textbooks. As a young man, he worked part-time for a journal of esoterica called Nauka i Religiya (Science and Religion), where he published an article on how to decipher runes. His first short story appeared in a 1989 issue of the journal that also included Stalin’s horoscope and an article about the abominable snowman. His first story collection, The Blue Lantern, published in 1991, won an important prize in Russia’s newly established ecosystem of western-style literary competitions. In his early, now classic, short stories and novellas, Pelevin drew on the Russian literary canon, the dismal humour of the late-Soviet period and its violent, sequinned aftermath, to create existential comedies that shocked and delighted his readers. The documentary Restless Garden, made by the Russian-American director Victor Ginzburg in August 1991, is a surreal snapshot of the world that shaped Pelevin’s early work. In the film, the beautiful bohemians of Moscow have gathered in Gorky Park to perform an “erotic art ritual”, complete with torch dances and wheels of fire. They are protesting Soviet repression – but in a matter of days there will be no Soviet government at all. The performance is a cross between a Duran Duran video and a Babylonian fertility ritual. A former ballerina turned stripper dances in a dovecote. The vodka-swigging Night Wolves, a gang of bikers who would later become avid supporters of Putin, serve as security. Impossibly beautiful women dance in mermaid tails, twirling around a man sporting a phallus made from a plastic funnel. While Ginzburg was filming this scene, Pelevin was most likely at his parents’ apartment, finishing his novella Omon Ra. Completed just days before the coup that precipitated the USSR’s final collapse, Omon Ra presents a grotesque alternative vision of the country’s space programme, which is still remembered as one of its proudest achievements. In Pelevin’s version, the cosmonauts had their legs cut off so that they could fit into the clapped-out Soviet spacecrafts. Like Laika the space dog, they were sent to die because the USSR didn’t have the technology to bring them back. Or perhaps, the novel suggests, they never went to space at all, and the whole “space programme” was a hoax, a vibrating box filmed in the Moscow metro system. Nearly everyone, in Russia and abroad, took Omon Ra to be satire. And they loved it. In the US, Spin magazine named it the novel of the year. But Pelevin explicitly rejected the label of satirist. In an interview, he explained that Omon Ra was in fact “a novel about coming of age in a world that is absurd and scary. My part of the scary world was Russia.” His novels were getting at something more universal than mere mockery of the Soviet Union. In his laconic 1993 novella The Yellow Arrow, passengers live on a train that is hurtling inexorably toward a broken bridge. When someone dies, the body is heaved out the window. Life on the train certainly resembles Russian society in the early 1990s, with its grotesque corruption, widespread drunkenness, bandit-entrepreneurs, underground artists and interest in the occult. But a Buddhist interpretation is equally apt. Pelevin was telling his readers that those in search of freedom must find a way to exit the moving vehicle – if not through death, then perhaps via meditative transcendence, or literature itself. “The evil magic of any totalitarian regime is based on its presumed capability to embrace and explain all the phenomena,” he once told an interviewer. “So if there’s a book that takes you out of this totality of things explained and understood, it liberates you.” Even after these early successes, Pelevin continued to live at his parents’ apartment, spending hours alone in his bedroom with his PC and PlayStation and little more than a mattress on the floor. (One of his early stories melds the computer game Prince of Persia with Soviet central planning.) Meanwhile, the world outside his bedroom was falling apart. Thanks to economic shock therapy, privatisation and hyperinflation, along with the near collapse of the state, Russia in the 1990s was such a violent, crime-ridden place that people were afraid to answer their own front doors. In the mid-90s, Pelevin sent a letter to Barbara Epler, his editor at the independent American publishing house New Directions. “I think you can use express mail to send the contract,” he wrote. “The only problem with it is that they deliver it at your place, and no sane person in Moscow opens the door at the ring. But if I know that something is going to arrive, I’ll take the risk.” Epler has a vivid memory of asking him, during his visit to New York, what elderly Russians were doing now that their pensions were worthless. “They die,” he said, looking her straight in the eyes. “I feel disgusted by everything about my country,” Pelevin told the New York Times in 2000. “In the Soviet times you could escape from the evil of the state by withdrawing into the private spaces of your own head; but now the evil seems to be diffused everywhere.” Even before he stopped giving interviews, Pelevin was unusually hard to pin down. Was he sinister or generous? Charming or boorish? How did he want readers to interpret his works? A 1996 interview with Clark Blaise, the director of the University of Iowa’s prestigious International Writing Program, is the only available video of Pelevin speaking. He wears sunglasses throughout. His voice is soft, almost soothing, and he has a winning, ironic laugh. He speaks English with the fluency and occasional mispronunciations (“paradigm” with a hard g) of a voracious reader. Throughout the interview, he resists literary and political labels, and all metaphorical readings. Of his forthcoming novel, The Life of Insects, Pelevin says, smiling: “It’s about insects, Clark.” Novels, he argues, are not a good way to learn about a country. If you want to learn about Russia, why not read a news article instead? Here is his trademark perversity; in 1996, many of his foreign readers were attracted to his work precisely because it provided a portal into post-Soviet life that was more vivid and more perceptive than anything they could read in a newspaper. At the time, Pelevin was helping to remake the Russian publishing industry, which was facing a crisis. This was a country whose greatest export was often said to be literature, where writers gave their names to thousands of streets, institutions and towns. But the collapse of the Soviet Union had destroyed the structures that had shaped Soviet and dissident literature for decades. Publishers were struggling to stay afloat. Detective novels, romance fiction and sensational nonfiction swept the market. One of the bestselling books of 1994 was a sequel to Gone With the Wind, written by “Julia Hillpatrick” – who was, in fact, a group of men employed by a Minsk publishing house. Pelevin, who straddled the realms of high literature and pulp fiction, was one of the only serious writers who sold well in this venal new marketplace. His first long novel, 1996’s Chapaev and Void (published in the US as Buddha’s Little Finger and in the UK as The Clay Machine-Gun) has been called the first post-Soviet Russian literary bestseller. In the late 90s, one Russian publication declared Pelevin the most fashionable writer in the country. Russian Playboy called him a “wizard”. The glamorous editor of Russian Vogue, Aliona Doletskaya, arranged for Pelevin to meet her and a Vogue journalist, Karina Dobrotvorskaya, at a Moscow sushi restaurant in 1999. When he arrived, two hours late, he began knocking back sake. In her article about the meeting, Dobrotvorskaya observed that he seemed to be playing a character. He spoke in the slang of Russian hoodlums, laughed long and loud at his own jokes, hooted with delight when he heard or pronounced a pleasing turn of phrase, and made extremely vulgar jokes about “thoroughly banging” women. When she took out a recorder, he expressed disappointment at the fact that an attractive interviewer only wanted to dine with him in order to record his bon mots. Later he suggested that if he sounded smart enough, she’d take off her clothes. This was not how the intelligentsia expected a great Russian writer to behave. In her account of the lunch, Dobrotvorskaya used a clever selection of interspersed quotes from Pelevin’s work to indicate her mounting impatience with his juvenile and sexist behaviour. The article was accompanied by a candid photo that remains the most unflattering image of Pelevin in circulation. His face puffy and belligerent, the famous writer looks like a drunk, ageing hooligan. He later claimed to the New York Times that Doletskaya had tricked him into the interview, recording him with a hidden microphone. But he is known for misleading journalists, especially foreign ones. In her article, Dobrotvorskaya made it clear that she was considering throwing a drink in Pelevin’s face. But she admitted that she was impressed by his bizarre, energetic mixture of the language of Russian classics, advertising slogans and thieves’ slang – the same kind of slang that Putin would later use in interviews. Pelevin was, in the words of the scholar Bradley A Gorski, “too irreverent to be a literary author, but too smart to be a pulp author”. Pelevin was a master of having it both ways and, for a while at least, this slipperiness was an asset rather than a liability. “Victor Olegovich has established his own brand so well that he should be a case study in textbooks on branding and ads,” one of Pelevin’s former editors once told a Russian journalist. “He’s the one no one sees, but everyone talks about.” When Gillian Redfearn, an editor at the UK sci-fi publisher Gollancz, edited Pelevin in the early 2010s, all communication occurred through a go-between. This intermediary told Redfearn there would be no question of an author photo. Gollancz published two of Pelevin’s novels, and then, “as mysteriously as he came into our list, he vanished again,” Redfearn told me. In a 2013 Russian television documentary about Pelevin, those who knew him in his youth describe his physical appearance as if they are helping to solve a world-historical mystery. Even his height, the shape of his eyes, his physical bearing are objects of fascination. He is big, with beautiful hands and an enigmatic smile. He doesn’t look wes | ||
Russia and Iran: The Limits of Strategic Partnership in the Face of Conflict - Robert Lansing Institute | ||
Tue, 08 Apr 2025 13:40:48 -0400
While Russia and Iran have deepened cooperation in recent years—especially through military-technical exchanges and shared opposition to Western influence—the Kremlin has signaled that it would not be obligated to support Iran militarily in the event of an external assault, despite the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in 2021. This stance reflects a careful Russian balancing act and raises questions about the credibility of its strategic commitments, the fragility of bilateral trust, and the limits of Moscow’s great-power ambitions. Russia often prefers non-binding or vague commitments in its bilateral agreements. The strategic partnership with Iran contains no mutual defense clause, unlike NATO’s Article 5. This gives the Kremlin maximum flexibility to avoid entanglement in direct military conflicts that do not serve its core interests. Russia is deeply stretched militarily due to its ongoing war in Ukraine and other global operations. A direct confrontation with the U.S. or Israel over Iran would be strategically disastrous, opening another front that Russia cannot afford. Despite tensions, Russia maintains a delicate but functional relationship with Israel, especially over Syrian airspace deconfliction. A full military commitment to Iran could fracture this balance and alienate wealthy Gulf partners like the UAE and Saudi Arabia, with whom Russia coordinates within OPEC+ and broader energy diplomacy. Implications for Russia’s Reputation as a Security Partner 1. Erosion of Trust Russia’s reluctance to offer Iran concrete military backing may undermine perceptions of Moscow as a reliable strategic partner, especially for countries facing Western military pressure. 2. Pattern of One-Sided Alliances Other states—such as Armenia, Serbia, or Central Asian republics—may interpret Russia’s stance as a warning: even strong rhetoric and partnership agreements don’t guarantee military protection. This can lead to diplomatic hedging or movement toward other security guarantors (e.g., China, Turkey, or even NATO). 3. Damage to Multilateral Initiatives Iran may rethink its engagement with Russia in multilateral formats such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or BRICS, where Tehran has sought deeper alignment. The lack of military assurances could reduce Moscow’s appeal as a pillar of alternative international order. Impact on Bilateral Relations with Iran 1. Growing Asymmetry The Russia-Iran relationship is becoming increasingly asymmetric: Iran provides drones and military tech for use in Ukraine, while Russia offers little concrete protection. This breeds resentment and could limit Iranian cooperation over time. 2. Strategic Recalibration in Tehran Iran may seek to diversify its partnerships, increasing outreach to China or accelerating its domestic military build-up. It may also question the sincerity of Russia’s anti-Western stance if Moscow continues to maintain equivocal relations with Israel or Arab rivals. 3. Tactical vs. Strategic Alliance Russia and Iran may remain tactical partners—cooperating in Syria or against Western sanctions—but will struggle to build a deep strategic alliance without mutual defense assurances. Consequences for Russia’s Broader Diplomacy 1. Weakening Soft Power in the Global South Many non-Western states view Russia as a counterweight to Western hegemony. If Russia is seen as unwilling to “walk the walk” when allies are threatened, it undermines that narrative. 2. Credibility Gap in Security Promises If Moscow’s strategic partnerships don’t include clear commitments or response plans, countries facing security threats may turn toward China’s rising defense networks or Western security umbrellas for protection. Russia’s refusal to commit to Iran’s defense in a future war exposes the limits of its power projection and the transactional nature of its alliances. While pragmatism may protect short-term interests, the long-term consequence is a reduction in diplomatic trust, a decline in influence among vulnerable partners, and the reinforcement of Russia’s image as a selective and self-interested power, rather than a dependable global actor. Strategic Ambiguity: Russia’s Reluctance to Defend Iran and the Limits of Its Global Commitments Introduction The strategic relationship between Russia and Iran has drawn considerable international attention in recent years. Both countries have found common ground in opposing Western dominance, particularly U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and Eurasia. However, Russia’s refusal to provide a concrete military guarantee to Iran in the event of an external assault—despite the 2021 Strategic Partnership Agreement—exposes the asymmetry and limits of this alliance. This paper examines why the Kremlin has taken this position, what it signals about Russia’s credibility as a strategic partner, and how it will impact both the bilateral relationship with Iran and Russia’s broader diplomatic posture. I. Russia’s Strategic Ambiguity: A Calculated Choice 1. Non-Binding Nature of the Strategic Partnership Agreement Unlike formal military alliances, such as NATO or the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Russia-Iran Strategic Partnership Agreement lacks enforceable defense clauses. This is a deliberate feature of Russian foreign policy, designed to preserve flexibility and avoid entanglement in conflicts that could escalate beyond Moscow’s control or interests. 2. Avoiding Strategic Overextension Russia is already heavily engaged in Ukraine, managing its military presence in Syria, and maintaining influence across Africa and Central Asia. Committing to Iran’s defense would risk overextending Russian military capabilities and provoke direct confrontation with the United States, Israel, or their allies. The Kremlin prefers to retain maneuverability rather than becoming entangled in another high-stakes theater. 3. Balancing Regional Relationships Russia has cultivated a complex network of relationships in the Middle East, including with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Taking a firm pro-Iranian military stance could jeopardize these ties, particularly given Israel’s opposition to Iranian entrenchment in Syria and its ongoing military operations against Iranian-backed forces. II. Implications for Russia’s Reputation and Global Commitments 1. Perceived Unreliability Russia’s unwillingness to defend a key partner like Iran raises doubts among other allies and partners regarding the reliability of Russian security guarantees. Countries that have previously relied on Moscow for support—such as Armenia or Belarus—may now question the depth of Russia’s commitments. 2. Shift Toward Transactional Diplomacy The Kremlin’s position underscores a broader shift toward transactional diplomacy: engaging in partnerships for immediate strategic benefit without long-term security commitments. This approach undermines the trust necessary for sustained alliances and can erode Moscow’s influence in regions where competitors like China are offering more concrete alternatives. 3. Challenges to Russia’s Soft Power in the Global South Many states in Africa, Latin America, and South Asia view Russia as a counterweight to Western interventionism. However, if Russia is perceived as unreliable or self-serving, its soft power appeal will wane. This could lead to a strategic realignment toward other powers or multilateral institutions. III. Effects on Russia-Iran Bilateral Relations 1. Rising Iranian Frustration Iran, which has supplied Russia with military drones and technology during the Ukraine conflict, may view Russia’s reluctance to commit as a betrayal. Tehran may begin to reassess the balance of the relationship, seeking more leverage or reducing cooperation in areas like Syria or arms sales. 2. Asymmetric Partnership and Strategic Drift The imbalance in the relationship—with Iran providing more tangible support to Russia than it receives in return—could lead to a gradual drift. Iran may pivot more toward China or attempt to assert greater autonomy in regional affairs, reducing Russian influence. 3. Tactical Cooperation Without Strategic Depth Despite tensions, Russia and Iran are likely to maintain tactical cooperation in Syria, energy coordination, and circumvention of sanctions. However, the absence of mutual defense commitments limits the depth and resilience of their alliance. IV. Broader Consequences for Regional and Global Politics 1. Decline in Russian Mediation Credibility Russia’s role as a mediator in Middle Eastern conflicts depends on its perceived neutrality and reliability. Its unwillingness to support Iran militarily could diminish its clout in future negotiations or multilateral efforts. 2. Incentive for Alternative Alliances Iran and other nations may increasingly look to China, regional organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), or even new blocs for security and economic cooperation. This could reduce Russia’s influence in institutions where it once played a leading role.3. Strategic Vacuum and Greater Instability By not offering a firm commitment, Russia risks creating a strategic vacuum in the event of a major crisis involving Iran. This could lead to greater instability in the Persian Gulf, heighten sectarian tensions, and draw in other global powers with unpredictable outcomes. | ||
Kash Patel's surprising appointment of a top J6 inquisitor to head DC FBI office | ||
Tue, 08 Apr 2025 11:46:59 -0400
The surprise appointment of a hard-line critic of Jan. 6 protesters to lead the FBI’s Washington Field Office has set the conservative political world ablaze and put new FBI Director Kash Patel in the line of fire from a vocal group of President Donald J. Trump supporters. News first broke April 4 in the New York Times that Steven J. Jensen was named assistant director in charge of the most powerful of the FBI’s 56 field offices. Conservative critics and pundits who were expecting to see the FBI gutted and reformed under President Trump took the news of Jensen’s appointment hard. Jensen 'built the construct for the January 6 witch hunt.' After the Times published an article about Jensen’s appointment, the Gateway Pundit called it “fake news.” On April 6, Blaze News confirmed Jensen’s appointment to the key FBI job. Debate raged on social media on whether Jensen’s appointment was real and why the FBI had not made a formal announcement of the promotion. Such major appointments are typically announced via a news release. Sign up for the Blaze newsletterBy signing up, you agree to our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use, and agree to receive content that may sometimes include advertisements. You may opt out at any time. “He was a key figure in this domestic terror push against January Sixers, according to testimony before the House,” said Tom Fitton, president of Judicial Watch. “He treated them all as terrorists and was one of the key instigators in pushing the narrative within the bureaucracy that these folks needed to be jailed and ferreted out.” The FBI’s National Press Office declined to comment on Jensen’s appointment and referred Blaze News to the homepage for the Washington Field Office, where Jensen is now listed as the assistant director in charge. Jensen was associated with some of the worst rights abuses at the FBI, according to Mike Howell, president of the Oversight Project. “Steve Jensen should not have a job at the FBI,” Howell told Blaze News. “He was on the bleeding edge of some of the worst abuses at the FBI. The coordinated pushback on those calling him out is unfortunate, but it’s already had to backtrack on key points. “For instance, first it was that Jensen was not promoted,” Howell said. “That turned out to be unequivocally false. Now we’re at the stage of people pretending it’s a good thing that he was promoted.” George Hill, retired FBI national security intelligence supervisor, called Jensen the “Tomás de Torquemada of the J6 round-up of ‘domestic terrorists.’” Torquemada was the first grand inquisitor of Spain in the 15th century. In testimony before Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government, Hill said he took part in regular phone conferences led by Jensen and former FBI Assistant Director Steven D’Antuono. New FBI Director Kash Patel. Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images “So you know, this is a conversation that took place almost two years ago,” Hill said in a private transcribed interview. “But the Philadelphia office said, ‘Well, there’s no evidence of any kind of, you know, violent leanings or insurrectionist leanings,’ to which Steve Jensen said, ‘You know, I don’t give a blank, they’re godd***ed terrorists and we’re going to round them all up.’” Hill said as chief of the Domestic Terrorism Operations Section at FBI headquarters, Jensen hosted regular conference calls that began two days after the Jan. 6 protests. “This conference call, everybody could dial into it,” Hill said on the April 7 episode of "The Kyle Seraphin Show." “So this is going into all the fusion centers where you have chiefs of police dialing in. You have members of the state police usually up to the rank of colonel participating, and all these people have direct access to people on the governors’ staff, the mayors’ staff. “So this information, this narrative of how our country almost fell, was going into the executive mansions of every state in the country and every mayor’s residence throughout the country on a twice-daily basis,” Hill said. Jensen “built the construct for the January 6 witch hunt,” Hill said. “After January 6, he had a ready-made buffet of never-ending domestic terrorists to go after, and he went at them very aggressively.” 'It’s absolutely indefensible.' Hill was the subject of blowback on X over his testimony, which he said was never called into question prior to news about Jensen surfacing on April 4. “That my name is about to get dragged is a diversion from the facts that are already in evidence that are unassailable, that Steven Jensen was the organizer of the entire J6 roundup, from the identification of subjects through the prosecution,” Hill said. Text of an email circulated on X April 6 by Blaze News confirmed the appointment of Jensen as head of the Washington Field Office. The March 28 email said Jensen would assume the role on March 31. “While this came rather unexpectedly as I recently was asked to serve as the acting Operations Director for the National Security Branch, I firmly believe in the philosophy of servant leadership and service over self,” Jensen wrote in a statement released by Phillip Bates, acting assistant director in charge of the Mission Support Division at WFO. “They are the driving forces of who I am and how I lead, and I am renewing my commitment to these principles as I transition into this new leadership role at WFO.” Jensen has been with the FBI for 19 years, most recently as special agent in charge of the FBI’s field office in Columbia, S.C. He was chief of the Domestic Terrorism Operations Section at FBI headquarters in Washington, D.C., from April 2020 through October 2021 and had a key role in the investigation of the Jan. 6 protests at the U.S. Capitol. The news of Jensen’s elevation to run the Washington Field Office thundered across conservative social media. “I’m going to call out any fraud who tries to suck up to Kash by defending the Steve Jensen promotion,” former Jan. 6 defendant William Pope wrote on X. “The man hunted down J6ers, destroyed American families, and labeled us terrorists. It’s absolutely indefensible.” Pope added: “Jensen gets the gold mine. J6ers get the shaft,” and said, “You can’t drain the swamp by promoting the swamp.” Members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation SWAT team patrol the Longworth House Office Building on Jan. 6, 2021.Photo by Erin Scott/Bloomberg via Getty Images Howell said that U.S. Rep. Jim Jordan (R-Ohio), chairman of the powerful House Committee on the Judiciary, was behind the pressure to name Jensen to the FBI post. Jordan denied the assertion through an unnamed spokesman, according to journalist Breanna Morello. Former FBI Special Agent Steve Friend, who was suspended without pay after raising concerns about the level of FBI force used to round up even misdemeanor Jan. 6 suspects, called Jensen’s appointment “disappointing.” “Steven Jensen exposed himself as partisan when he weaponized the FBI to persecute Americans over January 6,” Friend told Blaze News. Former Jan. 6 defendant Jennifer Heinl protested Jensen’s promotion, recounting how the FBI “completely destroyed my life.” “I’m one of the so-called terrorists that he didn’t give a damn about,” she wrote on X. “A mom from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, with no criminal background who was let in the open doors on the Senate side by Capitol officers. For 45 minutes, I walked around calling family members to let them know I was OK. Yeah, I was such a danger that you waited months to come get me and then after that completely destroyed my life.” Fitton said he’s troubled at the lack of discussion so far about reforming the FBI and Department of Justice. “For all I know, he’s a good guy and we’re all misinterpreting it,” Fitton said, “but what I am not seeing out of the FBI yet and what I’m not seeing out of the Justice Department yet is a radical remaking or even talking about it that we’ve seen with USAID, that we’ve seen with the Department of Education. There’s nothing the FBI is doing that another federal agency or local or state law enforcement can’t do.” FBI Deputy Director Dan Bongino, apparently responding to growing impatience for change but without directly referencing the controversy, asked for continued forbearance as the process unfolds. "When you see something happen, and the entire story isn’t public, and the underlying facts aren’t all public, it may appear counterintuitive to our reform agenda. I promise you, it’s not an accident," he posted to X on Sunday evening. "I realize asking you to 'trust me' is a waste of time. Watch what happens, continue to demand results, be cautious of narrative 'traps,' let time put the puzzle pieces together, and what we’re doing will make sense. I see and hear you and your feedback." Editor's note: This article has been updated to include a statement from FBI Deputy Director Dan Bongino. Like Blaze News? Bypass the censors, sign up for our newsletters, and get stories like this direct to your inbox. Sign up here! | ||
Book Review: 'Make Sure You Die Screaming' is an absurd road trip novel for modern times | ||
Tue, 08 Apr 2025 09:50:16 -0400
If you can’t beat ’em, join ’em on a multi-day, drunk-driving road trip in middle-class middle of America to find their missing father with a garbage goth girl named Yivi whom they met two weeks ago in an Airbnb basement. That seems to be the mantra for “Make Sure You Die Screaming,” Zee Carlstrom’s debut novel from Flatiron Books. The first-person narration follows no-name Gunderson, nonbinary queer person, at what surely must be their rock-bottom. They stole their ex-boyfriend Clinton’s car to drive from Chicago to Arkansas. Also the protagonist has killed their best friend, lost their job, and took an oath of radical honesty. So yes, if you were immediately skeptical about this fun, road trip adventure novel due to the clear lack of morals, you’d be right to hesitate. But it’s not all drunken rages and horrible decisions in a misguided attempt to punch back at late-stage capitalism. The protagonist, while an exceptionally unlikable character at their worst — disrespecting everyone like it’s going out of fashion, in the name of honesty — is also full of heart. Sometimes a nasty, festering, raw-emotions heart; a self-destructive time bomb that is sure to embed shrapnel in those unfortunate people who dare to hang around. Still, Carlstrom manages to shine the light back on the protagonist’s humanity and salvage reader sympathy when it matters most. And I must admit, I deeply related with the frequent use of the word “y’all” and the main character’s “ironic fashion mullet.” The breezy narration contrasts delightfully with the heavy topics laden like buckshot throughout the book, set in the post-truth Now, and Carlstrom’s unique voice is a breath of fresh air with just the right mix of humor and resigned cynicism with a dash of hope. “Make Sure You Die Screaming” is exceptionally well timed for the increasingly strange world we find ourselves in. Carlstrom’s debut has almost everything: comedy, action, adventure, philosophical musings, banter, alcoholism, crimes, weird cult-y things, and even some modicum of closure. And while the ending is abrupt, it’s also comforting, as well as oddly convincing given the sheer absurdity that precedes it. ___AP book reviews: https://apnews.com/hub/book-reviews | ||
Azerbaijan: Arbitrary arrest of Bashir Suleymanli and Mammad Alpay | ||
Mon, 07 Apr 2025 11:28:57 -0400
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