Day: May 25, 2024

The IDF announced on Thursday that its internal October 7 report will grapple with decisions made in real-time, though portions of it will examine events as far back as the 2014 Gaza conflict. Interim results are expected in June.

March 7 was the first time the IDF publicly affirmed that it would initiate a probe, saying at the time that it would investigate at least as far back as 2018; on Thursday, it said it would also examine the Gaza conflict that took place in the summer of 2014.

Probe to go farther back than stated initially, will analyze previously undealt with issues

In March 2018, Hamas initiated a low-intensity border conflict, rife with protests. Hamas Gaza Chief Yahya Sinwar led the move after resuming leadership of the enclave in February 2017. The scope of the timeline could hold implications for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who was premier for four and a half out of the six years being reviewed – until 2018.

A GIRL WALKS by the remains of a house in the northern Gaza Strip that was destroyed during Operation Protective Edge. (credit: MOHAMMED SALEM/REUTERS)

Implications await war cabinet minister Gadi Eisenkot, who was IDF chief of staff from 2015 to 2019; Aviv Kohavi, who served as IDF chief from 2019 until January 2023; and, naturally, all current IDF and defense officials, including IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Herzi Halevi, Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, and IDF intelligence chief Maj.-Gen. Aharon Haliva.If that was the only cut-off, it could have skipped over war minister Benny Gantz, who was IDF chief from 2011 to 2015, before the March 2018-2024 time frame. But if it goes back to mid-2014, it will also include the time frame when Gantz was chief.

Some have suggested that a review of the failed policies leading to the October 7 failure needed to go back to Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009, to Hamas’s taking control in Gaza in 2007, or even back to the Second Intifada, when the decision was made not to carry out a major anti-terror operation as that carried out in 2002 in the West Bank during Operation Defensive Shield.

According to the latest polls, Gantz has around double Netanyahu’s electoral support for the next Knesset if an election is held now, and on Wednesday he called for elections in September.

The 2018 time frame of the report could help Gantz against Netanyahu, while the 2014 time frame, specifically regarding IDF intelligence, could equalize things.

Military sources said the report could not go back forever because it would take too long to produce results.There was still no mention of whether an external review, which was originally planned, would still happen or, if so, when.

Absent this external review, the military was unclear about how IDF officials in the Operations Command could objectively judge Halevi, who outranks everyone there, as well as a few other officials, including Haliva, who is at the same level as the IDF Operations Command Chief-Maj. Gen. Oded Basiuk.

However, the air force noted that it would be involving both a reservist brigadier general and a reservist colonel – very senior officers – to perform portions of its probe.

In contract, the Southern Command said its probes would be carried out by the brigadier generals, colonels, and lieutenant colonels who were in place before, during, and after October 7, without outside oversight from reservist officers.

Initially, it was unclear why only the air force included outside oversight. But later, IDF sources said that the air force simply has more reservists as part of its standard operations than any other arm of the military.Halevi’s explanation has been that the probe is being carried out “to restore confidence to evacuated persons” from the South and North.

He said that the IDF and the country must learn from the tragedy and improve itself both on defense and on the attack.

Furthermore, Halevi said that the IDF failed the country’s civilians and that “it is hard to say we learned our lesson to the citizens of Israel without this probe.”

The probe will look into the IDF’s concept of the border, understanding Hamas, and how to prepare operationally for defending the country. It will also look into the intelligence and decision-making processes surrounding October 7, with a particular focus on the processes of defense between October 7 and October 10.

Although the overall instructions for the probe seem to only go up to October 10, some of the general probes and some of the specific command probes, such as the Southern Command, will also look into the war with Hamas after October 10.

For instance, in addition to Halevi’s and the entire IDF Southern Command’s broader perspectives, Southern Command will have a colonel or lieutenant colonel independently investigate each specific battle they fought.Five key IDF positions that will be analyzed include Nahal Oz, Kissufim, Erez, Pagah, and Re’im.The IDF divisions being probed in the Southern Command include the Gaza Division and Divisions 99, 36, 162, 98, and 252.

With roughly half the strength it had earlier in the war, Division 162 is currently the only one remaining in northern and central Gaza, and Division 98 is the only one remaining in southern Gaza.

The probe will also look at the method of rallying the reserves, the handling of logistics issues, and the process of evacuating Israeli civilians and the bodies of killed civilians from the borders, but these will be secondary to October 7 and the decisions leading up to October 7.

The navy, home front command, operations command, communications, and technology command will be probed as well.

The time has come for a thorough investigation into the Hamas massacre of October 7. Enough with the excuses, enough putting off the inevitable.

There are those who argue and say “not yet,” who say “wait until the war is over.” They claim that an investigation now will distract the IDF, intel agencies and political leadership from the concentration needed to make the crucial decisions to win this war.

They are wrong.

Israel is a strong democracy. At any given moment, the IDF, intel agencies and political leadership juggle multiple issues, huge issues, many of which we never even hear about. They are the A-Team. They can handle it.

The shock has worn off. The pain will never disappear. The more time that passes, the more memories become faded or altered or even influenced. The longer it takes, the more likely evidence will fade away and disappear. And it’s been too long already.

Palestinians take control of an Israeli tank after crossing the border fence with Israel from Khan Yunis in the southern Gaza Strip, October 7, 2023. (credit: ABED RAHIM KHATIB/FLASH90)

In December, a mere two months after the massacre, fears surfaced about commanders deleting video of Hamas training and other evidentiary material. Thankfully, in the end, that evidence was “relocated” and deemed appropriate to be viewed only by people with very special clearance.

On December 3, a message was posted on an IDF X account: “All the materials from the operational systems of the IDF related to documented events, are preserved and accessible to the relevant parties.” The message continued: “Like other operational materials, access to the materials is blocked to those who are not required to deal with them. Any other claim is baseless.”

No question that, leading up to October 7, many mistakes were made. No question that those who made the mistakes are already girding themselves against the accusations that will be hurled against them. No question that they are already internally accounting for their ultimate accountability.

THEIR MISTAKES were born out of a dangerous – dare I say toxic – mix of ineptitude, negligence and haughty arrogance. That more people in senior positions have not yet done their own soul searching and stepped down after publicly making their mea culpas honestly surprises me. But that’s where the arrogance comes in.

They know who they are. The guilt alone would crush most people. But these people are different.

Responsibility stops at the top. The heads and many of the deputy heads of the IDF, all the intel agencies and certainly the prime minister should resign. They would be smart to recount their mistakes without violating security issues and offer explanations for why they are still in position.

The ombudsman of the nation

Matanyahu Englman, Israel’s state comptroller and ombudsman, announced also in December that he was opening a thorough, impartial investigation into the massacre.

The comptroller of the State of Israel is much more than a simple comptroller. A comptroller looks at accounting and finances. The English title “comptroller” is misleading and incorrect – Mivaker HaMedina, “Critic of the State” is much more apt, more clearly defining the role that Englman holds.

The “mivaker” is voted in by the Knesset, Israel’s Parliament, and is accountable to the Knesset and the Knesset alone. It is a non-political position. In fact, the person holding the position may not be a member of Knesset.

The task of the state comptroller is to investigate and review all functions of government. Nothing is beyond their investigative purview. He or she is also the address for all complaints against the government, which means that the state comptroller is also the ombudsman of the nation.

THE MOVEMENT for Quality Government in Israel (MQG) petitioned the high court, Israel’s Supreme Court, to stop the investigation. The Attorney-General’s Office joined the case. The attorney-general wrote in their submission to the court: “The requested interim order [for Englman’s investigation to be halted] should be accepted, as holding an investigation at this time… will lead to substantive harm to the operational capability of security services and harm the fighting.” According to reports, the IDF went directly to Englman’s office, imploring him to halt his investigation.

The Supreme Court refused to stay or halt the state comptroller’s investigation. The Court gave all parties until June 8 to write their reasons for their stand. In the meantime, agencies – including the IDF, must adhere to Englman’s request for material and information.

Parenthetically, for those worried about senior leadership having too much to deal with at one time, that is the same date laid down to Bibi Netanyahu by Benny Gantz to come up with a new war plan or he will resign from the government.

In the spirit of full disclosure, Englman is married to my wife’s cousin. I am not here to defend him – I am defending the Jewish state. I am demanding justice for all those murdered, maimed and held captive. My agenda is to help heal a ruptured and torn state, the deeply saddened State of Israel.

The lion’s share of this war is over, but the war could drag on. The heart of the Jewish state now beats to a new normal rhythm. The time has come for those who should take responsibility to accept that responsibility; for those who are accountable to answer.

This is a moral and an ethical issue for the state and for its leaders. A thorough investigation is an issue of national safety and national security. As Englman correctly asserts, finding out exactly what happened and what led up to the massacre of October 7 will absolutely ensure a safer Israel.

On his desk, US president Harry S. Truman had a sign that read “the buck stops here.” He was ultimately responsible. The expression comes from card playing on the US frontier (not the nickname for the dollar). The dealer was chosen by the passing of a knife with a “buck horn” handle. If a person did not want to be the dealer, he passed the buck to another dealer.

The buck needs to stop in Israel – and it needs to stop now.

The writer, now based in the US, is a columnist and a social and political commentator. Watch his TV show Thinking Out Loud on JBS.